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1. Crossings in the High North  
This thesis will be a journey through civil societies and High North policies in search for 
links between democratic development and cross-border cooperation in the Barents 
Region. Through qualitative analysis based on questionnaires, interviews and documents I 
will be investigating connections between the democratic goals of Norway’s High North 
policy and civil society development in the Russian part of the Barents Region within the 
2000-2007 timeframe.  
In this introductory chapter, the path of study opens up through defining the fundamental 
research question. After that, the definitions and conceptualisations needed to navigate 
will be presented, followed by basic theory that connects the two main concepts of the 
guiding question: civil society and democratic development. In chapter 2 I will present an 
overview of Russian civil society history, Russian political elite understanding of 
democracy, and generate three hypotheses from theory on foreign involvement in Russian 
democratic development through civil society funding. Chapter 3 contains an overview of 
prior and current Norwegian High North policy in relation to Russia, while chapter 4 is 
dedicated to the research strategy. The main qualitative analysis of questionnaire and 
interview data will follow in chapter 5. Finally I will reach some conclusions to the main 
research question in chapter 6.  
The aspect of stability has remained central in Norwegian foreign policy after the Cold 
War, although the basis for this focus has changed drastically from politics of deterrence 
and reassurance to widespread cooperation. Providing stability in northern Europe 
continues to be the highest aim of the High North policy and of regional bodies of 
cooperation, like the Barents Euro Arctic Region (BEAR) cooperation. On the current 
cooperation agenda are in particular potential development of oil and gas resources, 
fishery management, nuclear security and other core relations that connect Norway with 
its main cooperation partner in the High North, the Russian Federation. Part of the 
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Norwegian stability and cooperation strategy is devoted to attempts of influencing the 
political system in Russia in order to consolidate the kind of inclusive democracy that 
Norway prefers in a neighbouring nuclear power. Ideas of democratic peace and stable 
cooperation seem to correlate in contemporary Norwegian High North policy.  
During the past years Norwegian High North policy has developed a broader, bolder and 
economically stronger form. The High North strategy of the current government is 
heavily promoted to Norwegian voters and foreign allies alike, and verbal involvement in 
Russia’s domestic affairs seems to increase as the federation’s centralising policies 
become more internationally criticized. What is being done to stabilise the Barents region, 
except for direct bilateral appeals and collegial conduct? Is strengthening democracy 
enhancing forces in the region important for this overall goal? I am convinced that it is, 
and in this chapter I will explain why.  
1.1 The guiding question  
I wish to find out how the stated Norwegian objectives of cooperation in the High North 
concerning Russia’s democratic development are being realised. Based on the premise 
that Norway does indeed seek to promote democratic development in the Barents region, 
I will try to answer the following question:  
How does Norwegian democracy promotion influence the advocates of democratic 
development, in the form of civil society organisations, in North-West Russia? 
Norwegian democracy promotion is here defined as the official Norwegian funding of 
projects to civil society organisations (CSOs) that aim to develop democratic values 
through civil society activity in North-West Russia. Official Norwegian funding is defined 
in chapter 3 as part of the Norwegian High North policy. Other terms in the research 
question also need clarifications, including what is meant by democratic values, civil 
society, CSO and North-West Russia. Let us begin with the latter.  
8 
1.1.1 Definitions 
 
Figure 1.1 Map of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. 
Source: Barentsinfo 2007. 
There is a need to specify the geographic definition of the area in question, given that 
there are several official definitions of North-West Russia. The official Norwegian 
understanding includes the Russian part of the BEAR, i.e. Murmansk and Arkhangelsk 
Oblasts (regions),1 the Republic of Karelia, Nenets Autonomous Okrug (district) and the 
Republic of Komi (Barents Secretariat 2006, Blakkisrud and Hønneland 2001). The 
Russians define North-West Russia as the North-western Federal Okrug, which also 
includes the oblasts of Vologda, Kaliningrad, Kirov, Leningrad, Novgorod and Pskov, 
and finally the city of St. Petersburg. In my research I will employ the term according to 
the official Norwegian definition. 
                                              
1 When I write about the oblasts I use the name Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. When I refer to the cities, I add “city”. Arkhangelsk 
city and Murmansk city are the administrative centres under the jurisdiction of the oblasts with the same name. 
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The term CSO reaches beyond the more common Non-Governmental Organisation 
(NGO), and includes organisations, associations and foundations that are not necessarily 
labelled “NGO” by Russian official standards. Russian practice provides a multitude of 
names and abbreviations for groups that operate in the civil society sphere. By using CSO 
for all of them I simply indicate that the civil society actor in question is an organised 
non-governmental, non-profit group. I will use the term NGO when the organisation in 
question labels itself as such, is registered with the authorities as such, and when referring 
to literature on NGOs. The CSOs under scrutiny in my guiding question are operating 
with goals related to developing civil society or promoting such goals by the character of 
their work. Usually such organisations advocate the interests of specific groups or 
subjects in the local society or in the region. 
Democratic values are here defined beyond the minimum democratic principles of rule of 
law, representative government, and political freedom to participate in the political 
process by voting in and/or running for open and free election. Included in this definition 
are also extended values of liberal democracy, i.e. personal liberty to think and act 
without government control, and equality in the sense of equal rights to the same 
treatment regardless of ethnicity, sex, religion, heritage or economic status etc.; in brief 
the rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 2007). 
A clarification of the term civil society is furthermore necessary to elucidate the content of 
the guiding question. The close connection between democracy and civil society is widely 
acknowledged in the literature on democratic development and foreign democracy 
assistance to such (e.g. Carothers 1999, 2006, Diamond 1999, Howard 2002, Linz and 
Stepan 1996a, Putnam 1993). Civil society is the platform on which the CSOs operate, 
albeit with great variation in form and intention, and they interact in various degrees with 
state and business actors. What the term civil society tries to capture and what its 
relationship to democracy might be, is explained in the following theory section. 
10 
 
1.2 Exploring the concept of civil society   
Civil society is a notoriously tricky term to define. It is not an equivalent to society as a 
whole, but certainly a part of it. It does not have a concrete shape, but it is made up of 
active actors who publicly ‘express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchanging 
information, achieving mutual goals, make demands on the state and hold public officials 
accountable’ (Diamond quoted in Freres 1999:45). There is agreement on civil society 
being a sphere of public activity by citizens outside the two institutional complexes of 
market and state, although it interacts closely with both of them.  
Classical liberal theory especially focuses on the relationship between civil society and 
government, and considers the government to be a community’s agent and provider of 
governance. Civil society according to classical liberals is thus the community that 
delegates authority to the government as well as the body within which the ultimate 
authority lies (Scalet and Schmidtz 2002:27). In this way, the term captures everything 
but governance: businesses, schools, unions, clubs, media, religious organisations, 
libraries, charities, families. In short: ‘all non-governmental forms of organisation through 
which the community’s members relate to one another’ (ibid.). Such a definition is not 
very helpful for my research, since it shares no common features beyond the non-
governmental. It is necessary to narrow the term down considerably, keeping democracy 
development in mind.  
Civil society is often defined as ‘the third sector’, the non-governmental organisations 
that operate in the civic sphere between the state and the economic agents. It might seem 
simplistic to narrow civil society down merely to CSOs, especially when it has been 
shown that more complex networks of civic relations are important to the democratic 
aspects of civil society (Carothers 1999, Putnam 1993, 1995). Robert Putnam (1993) 
came up with the term ‘social capital’ after a study of different regions and civil societies 
in Italy. Social capital is not synonymous with civil society, but there are close links 
between the two concepts. Social capital covers ‘features of social organisation, such as 
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trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions’ (ibid.:167). Building social capital thus becomes practically the same 
as strengthening civil society through creating CSOs, improving the capacity of CSOs, 
aiding their network building, and supporting their civic education activity – which 
facilitates more public participation in everyday democracy (Freres 1999:46).  
The social capital thesis argues against reducing definitions of civil society to merely 
politically relevant CSOs. According to Putnam, overall levels of social trust, networks 
and norms that facilitate cooperation are much more important factors to the development 
of civil society than the direct political relevance of associations. Putnam (1993) even 
goes beyond organisations and points out that activities not related to organised 
membership, such as newspaper reading and open forum debates are just as important to 
social capital as NGO-activity.  
Why should I then choose to interpret the concept ‘civil society’ in the narrow sense of 
organised civil society activity? I choose to do so firstly because an alternative focus on 
social capital would create a measurability problem, since the social capital concept 
covers such a wide range of non-organised activities as well as the more measurable 
CSO-activity. Finally I choose to focus on CSOs for the reason that CSOs are essential in 
the study of civil society’s importance to democracy development. This is especially 
pertinent as vital channels for foreign investments are presently being made in developing 
democracy in Russia.  
1.2.1 Civil society and democracy  
If the population turns completely passive and just lies on the couch and eats popcorn, then 
democracy will be dead. (Martinussen 2007 [interview])2
 
2 English quotations from documents, speeches and interviews in Norwegian are based on my own translations throughout the 
thesis. 
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The young environmental NGO (ENGO) activist who expressed this connection between 
civic activity and democracy shares an idea with most of the civil society researchers 
referred to in this introduction, namely that ‘the strength of the civil society sphere and 
the health of democracy are closely related’ (Rossteutscher 2005:242). Christian L. Freres 
(1999) connects civil society with the development of a more complete, ‘consolidated’ 
democracy through two channels creating mechanisms for greater citizen participation in 
the democratic process. In the first channel civil society can be strengthened through CSO 
activity of various kinds. In the second channel governments can adopt policies allowing 
new groups a good enough income to have a minimal level of participation. CSOs can be 
part of the second channel as well as the first, if they are consulted by the government on 
policy matters. My research question is geared towards tracing foreign influences on this 
process; thus I will focus on the first channel, which opens up for foreign influence on the 
mechanisms described in figure 1.2.  
1. Strengthening 
civil society 
2. Measures to improve 
equality  of entire society
Capacity building, 
civic education, 
etc. 
Policies for 
socio-economic 
redistribution, some 
involving CSOs 
in design and 
execution
Improve participation/
empowerment
Broader and 
deeper 
democracy
Final goalIntermediary output MechanismsChannels
(Positive feedback)
 
Figure 1.2 Freres’ two channel model for ‘democracy distribution’. 
Source: Freres 1999 (45, table 3.1) 
Putnam (1995:75) connects the idea of civil society and democratisation to countries 
where democracy has not yet been deeply rooted. Even though his thoughts on the subject 
may be getting out-dated in this rapidly changing world, they still refer to core post-
communist democratic difficulties: ‘The concept of “civil society” has played a central 
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role in the recent global debate about the preconditions for democracy and 
democratization. In the newer democracies this phrase has properly focused attention on 
the need to foster a vibrant civic life in soils traditionally inhospitable to self-government’ 
(ibid.).  
A significant feature of civil society in the development of democratic values lies in the 
actions it takes towards the political sphere and the state on behalf of the public groups it 
represents. Strong citizen organisations provide channels for popular interest as well as 
act as a check on the government when it comes to rule of law and human rights. In 
addition, organisational activism provides alliances for reaching common goals. Networks 
and collaboration in civil society are crucial to the possibilities of actual influence on 
politics and democratic development (Linz and Stepan 1996b). Putnam (1993) even 
argues that dense infrastructure of groups is the key to making democracy work. Civic 
groups and democratic stability are according to Putnam connected in two ways: 
internally, civic groups inspire cooperation, solidarity, public spiritedness and trust. 
Externally, the group networks aggregate interest and articulate demands in order to 
ensure the government’s accountability. The importance of CSOs and CSO-networks 
emerges from these lines of thought.  
Although, as mentioned, there is an overall agreement on a relationship between civil 
society and democracy, there is still discussion about the direction of causality between 
the two phenomena. Does civil society influence democracy or is the path in fact 
opposite, from democracy to civil society? It can be argued that the connection goes both 
ways; e.g. Freres (1999) includes this mechanism as ‘positive feedback’ in his model just 
described in figure 1.2.  
A two-way argument is that with more democratic freedom, there is more room for civil 
society development. And conversely, with more civil society development, there is a 
greater force working for the conditions of a healthy democracy; influencing politics by 
pressuring the government and putting subjects of interest on the political agenda. The 
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influences between civil society activity and democracy seem to be in constant flow back 
and forth, and so it is more appropriate to speak of correlation between the two than a 
direct causal connection. If there is no democracy there can be no free civil society 
activity, and if civil society is lacking, democracy is but a mere shell of its potential.  
1.3 Chapter summary 
This introduction has presented the guiding question that this thesis aims to answer. Key 
concepts, such as geographic limitations, CSOs and civil society, have been clarified by 
providing definitions and developing a basic theoretical framework. What the concept 
Norwegian democracy promotion might contain is left for the third chapter on Norwegian 
High North policy and cooperation with Russia. Civil society theory presented in this 
chapter aims to shed light on the manifold content of “civil society” as well as to point out 
the narrower approach that this thesis will be taking to the term. Especially relevant for 
the coming analysis is the connection between civil society and democracy, which has 
been briefly discussed above. In the next chapter this theory will be put into the context of 
Russian civil society and democracy development, and foreign involvement therein.  
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2. Russian civil society  
We lost the social capital – and now we must restore it on a new base. Money seems to be 
everything now, but we need something else. (Elena Kruglikova 2007 [interview]) 
Russia is considered to be a particularly illuminating case for the study of civil society 
development and foreign actors’ role in such (e.g. Henderson 2002, Mendelson 2001, 
Sundstrom 2006) because Russian civil society basically started from scratch around the 
time of transition from authoritarian rule in the late 1980s. It thus becomes easier to 
measure effects of foreign actors’ involvement in the development of a fresh civil society.  
Russian civil society is furthermore considered to be fundamentally weak, mainly due to 
the Soviet regime’s tactics of “flattening” society (e.g. Evans 2005, Linz and Stephan 
1996a, McFaul 2001). Independent forms of political and social organisation were strictly 
prohibited and eliminated, and diversity of opinion was not an option in most of the 
Soviet Union’s existence. Hence post-Soviet civil society suffered from the setback of 
more than seventy years of systematic repression. This is the main explanation to why 
Russia differs from many other third wave democracies3 when it comes to the role of civil 
society activity in the new regime (Sundstrom 2001:3).  
A number of historical and contemporary explanations are important when the role of 
CSOs in Russia’s democratic development is to be outlined. In the first part of this 
chapter I will examine essential historical and political aspects of Russian civil society. In 
the second part I will outline some theoretical aspects on foreign funding of Russian civil 
society actors, and ultimately suggest three main hypotheses that will guide the further 
data collection and analysis.   
 
3 The term “third wave democracy” first appeared in Samuel P. Huntington’s work The Third Wave (1991). Huntington defines 
the third major wave of democratisation as the transition processes beginning with Portugal in 1974, including the post-Soviet 
and East European post-communist states.  
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2.1 A third sector emerges 
The first CSOs were established in RSFSR at the end of the 1980s, in the time of Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s reform period known as perestroika; the reconstruction policy of economy 
and society that had stagnated under Leonid Brezhnev’s leadership (Hanley et. al. 
1995:646). Of most importance for the new CSOs were Gorbachev’s other large 
initiative, i.e. the glasnost politics of societal changes towards a more open society. The 
old communist regime, where all public flows of information and legal organisational 
activity were under state control, would soon after collapse.  
History does however show the origins of the first Russian non-governmental, non-profit 
organisations in the citizen rights groups that formed already at the end of the 19th 
century. These voluntary associations provided badly needed services in the Tsarist state, 
especially during the First World War, but gradually disappeared after 1917 with the 
Bolsheviks’ suppression of independent social organisations.  
A shorter historical line of origin – more relevant to the contemporary CSO-definition – 
goes to the dissident movement (the illegal opposition) and the informal cultural 
underground groups in the USSR (Skvortsova 2000:17). These groups were loosely 
organised and united mainly because of their opposition to the regime, and so they had 
little representative value for any specific group in Russian society. With their loose 
organisational structures and fluid memberships, most of them disappeared after the end 
of the Soviet regime (Sundstrom 2006:4, 28). Parallel to the dissident groups, there were 
also legal organisational life outside of the party and labour movement in the USSR. 
These were defined as ‘voluntary citizen organisations’, of which the prime example is 
Soviet Red Cross. As everything else, these organisations were also part of the state 
structure (Skvortsova 2000:17).  
Stronger civil groups’ initiatives came with the new political situation, in the aftermath of 
a wave of protests with mass demonstrations and meetings. Informal groups with semi-
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political agendas also came together in the late 1980s.4 Political parties and CSOs arose 
from this civic wave and from the opening of the borders to foreign democracy assistance 
dressed as CSO-funding. 
2.2 The insecure 1990s  
After the regime change and the new freedoms of speech and organisation, the Russians 
did not turn out to be the people of civic activists that many observers expected. Why was 
this so, even after such a promising beginning of new civil society activity of both 
domestic and foreign CSOs in the 1990s? To arrive at an answer one must go through the 
decade of fresh beginnings, hopes and great deceptions that constituted Boris Yeltsin’s 
presidency against the backdrop of a ‘triple transition’ (Offe 1996).5 In such transitions, 
comprising not only democratic-, but economic- and state transformation as well, it is 
common that civil society demobilises in some degree (McFaul 2001:321). As Alfred B. 
Evans points out, the general weakness of civil society in post-communist Russia would 
become obvious during the 1990s. To clarify the reasons for this development, it is 
helpful to divide the events affecting civil society into three categories: cultural, economic 
and political (Evans 2005:102,103).  
The cultural legacy from Soviet times still affects people’s attitudes toward voluntary 
associations that seek social change. Soviet ‘opportunistic individualism’ is connected 
with the population’s division of Soviet society into two spheres – the private 
relationships of trust and true helpfulness, and the public sphere of mistrust where self-
interest prevails (Evans 2005:102). In the first sphere personal networks and contacts 
 
4 The most significant of which was to become the human rights organisation Memorial. Another important representative of such 
early activist initiative was the Moscow Helsinki Group (Sundstrom 2006:28). 
5 Russia faced the problems of what Claus Offe (1996) describes as the ‘triple transition’ from communist rule to liberal market 
democracy, namely the transformation of politics (democratisation), economy (marketisation) and the nation state. Russian 
transition challenges were based on the three major transition dimensions of political democratisation, economic deregulation and 
state decentralisation in a federal system (Gel’man and Steen 2003:1-2). 
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were also a way to obtain benefits or to avoid going through formal procedures. This was 
important and positively associated in a society characterised by material scarcity such as 
the USSR, and the phenomenon even has a Russian word – blat (Skedsmo 2005:28). In 
such relationships of mutual gain in exchange of favours there is an element of trust in 
deed important for civil society networks, but at the same time excluding of networking 
on a larger scale. ‘The new Russian individualism’ of the 1990s can be seen as a direct 
continuation of this Soviet ‘opportunistic individualism’ (Evans 2005:102). 
Russia’s economic depression during the 1990s, with the dire crisis in August 1998 when 
the state in reality went bankrupt, is the basis of the economic explanation for the weak 
civil society. The small Russian middle class that had emerged after 1991 suffered 
severely after the financial collapse. As the middle class traditionally has been the main 
participants and financiers of civic organised life, this had grave consequences. Civic 
engagement was something people could not afford, even if they wanted to. In stead, 
former leaders of the democracy movement groups took on jobs in government or 
business (Evans 2005:103). The wealthy oligarchs did to some extent take over the role as 
financier of civil society groups after they had made enormous fortunes during the corrupt 
privatisation of Russian State assets under Yeltsin, but frequently this patron activity had 
an opportunistic edge.  
Politically, the dissident organisations had accomplished their goal of overthrowing the 
communist regime and did not redefine any further purpose in the new society. Even 
Democratic Russia, the prime mass democratisation movement behind the regime 
transition, did not succeed in adapting to the new realities and convert itself into a ‘party-
like organisation’ (Flikke 2006:8). A main factor that contributed to the political failure of 
groups like Democratic Russia was the ambivalent policies of political leaders like 
Yeltsin (Linz and Stepan 1996a:377-378). On his way to gain power, Yeltsin benefited 
from the support of Democratic Russia, but he did not want to lead it as a party or even 
help it to become a party. Instead he put the role of the President above party politics and 
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appealed to his superior democratic legitimacy over parliament based on his direct 
presidential election. This ‘anti-institutional style of presidentialism’ (Linz and Stepan 
1996a:396), together with the prioritising of economic reform before democratic state 
building and liberalisation before democratisation, weakened the institutionally based 
democracy in the new Russian Federation. As a result the underdevelopment of political 
parties between 1991 and 1993 made civil organisations disconnected from state politics. 
After the parliamentary elections of 1993, when the parties began to achieve more 
influence and play a more substantial part in state politics, the cleavage between political 
society and civil society became obvious (McFaul 2001:322). 
Despite these factors that all have had negative influences on the civil sphere, new CSOs 
kept popping up during the first half of the decade. Women organisations, ENGOs, 
soldier’s rights groups, and many other kinds of organised voices were represented in the 
CSO community. Social and health-care related issues became part of the CSO repertoire 
later on in this first period, when the state saw the benefits of having the CSOs take over 
many of the tasks that the old regime had managed on social areas. The CSOs got more 
established during the second half of the 1990s and they became more involved in public 
decision making (Skvortsova 2000:19). After 2000 the slight headway in the CSO sphere 
was set in reverse, and CSO activity was once again put under firm state control.  
2.3 Tightening control after 2000 
Even though the authoritarian state control disappeared with the transition to a democratic 
regime, a state with far more control over civil society and institutions than is found in 
liberal democracies continues to characterise Russian society today. After Vladimir Putin 
became president in 2000 he has initiated restrictions on organised civil life and taken 
control over democratic development and society’s development in general, for instance 
by decreasing pluralism in mass media, limiting independence of regional government, 
and intimidating oligarchs to support his politics. International criticism of the Russian 
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style democracy is frequent and can be quite harsh; e.g. the Freedom in the World Survey 
for 2006 rates Russia ‘not free’ (Freedom House 2006a).  
Tight state control does not seem to worry the average Russian too much, though. In fact, 
Russians tend to regard the state’s regulation of organisational life as positive. A Russian 
opinion survey from 2006 on knowledge of and attitudes towards NGOs (Russian 
Analytical Digest 2006:9) shows that 67 % of the participants believed that the financing 
of NGOs, from both foreign and Russian funds, had to me monitored. 
Despite popular disinterest and scepticism, the CSO sector has indisputably grown during 
the last two decades, although it seems difficult to say with certainty to what extent. 
According to the state statistical bureau Goskomstat there were 484,989 non-profit 
organisations registered in Russia as of 1. January 2000. However, only 20-25% of these 
were considered active (Barandova 2007:8). Estimations of how many NGOs operate in 
Russia vary greatly, e.g. the European Economic and Social Committee estimated some 
300,000 NGOs in 2004 – and assumed that only 10% of these were continuously active 
(Piehl 2004:13). 
In April 2006 new NGO-legislation was implemented in the Russian Federation. The 
government explained the new amendments on registration and accountability procedures 
for Russian NGOs and their foreign donors with the fight against terrorism and money 
laundering, because terrorist networks and white collar criminals can cover up as NGOs 
and subsequently there is a need to control financial flows to Russian NGOs (Schmidt 
2006). An overview over active NGOs is considered necessary, and expectations were 
made to have an official Russian estimate published in the spring of 2007. In the middle 
of May these numbers are still unknown to the public.  
Criticism of the new regulatory framework has stressed that ‘the measures are highly 
ambivalent, not least because official rhetoric is inconsistent with actual measures and 
bureaucratic practice’ (Schmidt 2006:2), i.e. politics and security arguments are used to 
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implement merely technical changes in legal documents. It is also seen as an expression 
of the Russian authorities’ fear of colour revolutions (Carothers 2006, Machleder 2006:8), 
especially after the orange revolution in Ukraine, when civil society forces successfully 
coloured the revote of the 2004 presidential election in favour of the most pro-Western 
candidate. Stricter rules on registration of foreign funding and more bureaucratic work for 
the CSOs receiving such funding are some of the consequences believed to come from 
this law reform (Evans 2005, Scmidt 2006). The NGO law is still only one of many 
control mechanisms used on the CSOs.6  
Another form of state control with CSOs is top-down initiatives. Sundstrom (2006:6) 
argues that the Putin regime seeks a type of state corporatist system similar to the one that 
existed in the former Soviet regime, in which institutions that structure citizens’ 
participation are initiated and controlled by the state. These institutions are being created 
from above with the intention of constituting a framework for civic activity. ‘The Civil 
Society Institutions and Human Rights Council under the President of the Russian 
Federation’, established by Putin in November 2004 (Schmidt 2005a:25) is an example of 
such an institution in today’s Russia.7  
The new ‘Civic Chamber’ (Obshchestvennaia palata) is another well known example of a 
state initiated civil society institution. Established in May 2005, the Civic Chamber 
consists of CSO leaders who are meant to represent citizens’ views to the government as a 
collective ombudsman. It also contains a ‘Commission to Study Practices for 
Guaranteeing Human Rights and Basic Freedoms and Monitoring Guarantees for them in 
Foreign States’. The task of this commission is to watch and report on human rights and 
 
6 ‘What is commonly called ”The NGO law” is part of the broader bill “On introducing amendments to certain legislative acts of 
the Russian Federation” which is aimed at revising the Civil Code, the law on closed administrative territorial formations, the law 
on public associations, and the law on non-profit organizations’ (Schmidt 2006:3).  
7 The council is a replacement for the former Commission on Human Rights (Schmidt 2005a), and the current chairwoman is the 
highly profiled Ella Pamfilova. 
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freedoms in EU countries, the USA and the post-Soviet countries as well as preparing a 
proper Russian concept of democracy and freedoms (Schmidt 2006a:25). 
2.3.1 Russian views on democracy  
Different views on of what democracy really entails are significant when trying to 
understand civil society and democracy in context. Even if values of democracy are 
universal, civil societies are certainly not. Does a specific official Russian understanding 
of democracy exist? The form of democratic system that emerged in Russia after the 
collapse of the Communist regime was not one that promoted Western democratic ideals8 
of participation and public liberties, but rather one oriented towards economic and 
political problem-solving. Political elites rising out of Soviet society was even accused of 
lacking the consciousness of thinking in liberal and democratic ways, much because of 
the absence of a civil society in the USSR (Linz and Stepan 1996a:378). The idea of a 
Russian form of democracy has become more accentuated by Russian leaders as the 
international critique towards development of Russian democracy increases.  
Russia is a country that has chosen democracy through the will of its own people. It chose this 
road of its own accord and it will decide itself how best to ensure that the principles of 
freedom and democracy are realised here, taking into account our historic, geopolitical and 
other particularities and respecting all fundamental democratic norms. As a sovereign nation, 
Russia can and will decide for itself the timeframe and conditions for its progress along this 
road. But consistent development of democracy in Russia is possible only through legal 
means. All methods of fighting for national, religious and other interests that are outside the 
law contradict the very principles of democracy and the state will react to such methods firmly 
but within the law. (Putin 2005) 
 
8 Differences between various Western forms of democracy, both in political systems and normative discourse are evident. This 
discussion does, however, fall outside the framework of this thesis. For more on this debate, see e.g. Schmidt (2005b). 
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In this excerpt from the annual address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation 
on 25 April 2005, President Vladimir Putin expressed that he does not need “democracy 
assistance” from foreigners. This speech applies a position of Russian values in an 
international context of increasing critique of Russian authoritarian development 
(Schmidt 2005b:53,54).  
International critique against Russian style democracy is broadly based on the state’s 
authoritarian attitude towards civil society, researchers and the press, and its control with 
the entire democratisation process. Russian critique on the other hand emphasises that the 
Russian legislative situation is seriously challenging for the CSOs, and that law 
enforcement and corruption have negative consequences for the CSOs’ situation. Russian 
researchers thus generally use a somewhat more neutral language in their characteristics 
of the same problems, e.g. that ‘civil liberties and press freedom need to be further 
developed and safeguarded’ (Proskuryakova et. al. 2005:3).  
The St Petersburg Humanitarian and Political Science Centre “Strategy” and the 
Department of Public Policy of the Moscow State University Higher School of 
Economics made an assessment of Russian civil society in 2005, in which they concluded 
that ‘civic activism is not likely to substantially grow in the near future, since abolished 
elections of regional governors and the limitation of the space for policy engagement by 
citizens does not contribute towards citizens’ activism’ (Proskuryakova et. al. 2005:3). 
The same evaluation concludes that  
(…) the connection between civil society and the Russian population remains rather weak. 
Furthermore, civil society suffers from insufficient resources, first of all, but not exclusively, 
financial. Foreign foundations, which still remain a key donor group in Russia, are 
downsizing their presence in the country, while grant and charitable programs of Russian 
authorities and businesses are still to gain weight, scope and experience. (ibid.) 
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2.4 Foreign involvement   
A weak civil society is the first of two factors indebted to communist repression, which 
make post-Soviet countries interesting cases for studying effects of foreign involvement 
in civil societies. The second factor is the closed nature of the Soviet state. Because 
contact between Soviet citizens and foreigners was controlled and regulated in the USSR, 
Western CSOs that looked to the RSFSR during glasnost found a society where 
transnational CSO cooperation was virtually unknown.  
An aspect to have in mind when dealing with foreign funding of Russian civil society is 
the fundamental differences between the Western model of CSO activity and the post-
Soviet one. The Western liberal understandings and expectations of CSOs are often not 
meaningful in Russian reality and foreign sponsors of civic activity are frequently 
criticised as lacking the proper understanding of and sufficient connection to local needs 
and realities. Organisational initiative from foreign sources with little understanding of 
post-communist society risk affecting civil society development negatively (Henderson 
2002). Based on this and other recent theories on the nature of foreign funding of Russian 
CSOs,9 I will in the following set forth three hypotheses with corresponding 
operationalisations. The first two assume consequences of Norwegian funding of CSOs in 
North-West Russia, and the third deduces influences of CSO cooperation with local 
authorities.  
2.4.1  H1: Short-term results vs. civic development  
Following the line of thought presented by Henderson (2002), the effects of Western and 
international assistance on building civil society and democracy in Russia are generally 
quite negative. Instead of building grassroots initiatives and horizontal networks of civic 
 
9 By recent I have in mind theories developed to capture the developments in this sector after 2000 and the onset of the Putin 
regime.  
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engagement within the Russian CSO environment and between the CSOs and the 
population, foreign aid contributes to creating ‘vertical, institutionalized and isolated 
(although well-funded) civil community’ (Henderson 2002:140). Unequal relationships 
between Western funders and Russian CSOs are the result, despite other idealistic 
intentions from the donors (ibid.). Consequently, a patron-client relationship between the 
donor and the Russian recipient is established in the frame of funding. This structure 
impedes successful collective action in building a civic community because short-term 
benefits are preferred over long-term development by both the Russian recipients of 
funding and by the funders who desire traceable results. This ultimately hinders rather 
than facilitates civic development (Henderson 2002:141). 
Accordingly, there is reason to question the sustainability of projects solely based on 
foreign funding. How can the work be sustained after the end of the project funding? 
Grants are typically project-based, and projects are normally limited to one year of 
funding before there has to be a new grant application. If there is no way of keeping the 
projects up and running by developing into a permanent structure when the money-flow 
stops, there is no real contribution to a long-term development of civil society.  
Henderson (2002) stresses the point that incentives of grant-receiving CSOs apply for 
both the Russians and for their foreign partners. In this case, the Norwegian civil 
organisations that redistribute grants to Russian recipients also have to get money from 
somewhere. The source is frequently a Norwegian ministry or another state financed 
institution, like a county or the Barents Secretariat. The Norwegian CSOs thus have to 
convince their grant givers that there is a good reason to back their cause. In this way 
Norwegian CSOs are not free intermediate actors, and their incentive can be to design 
projects that emphasise short-term goals so as to produce results. In this way ‘all of those 
involved in building civil society with the help of foreign funding are encouraged to 
pursue short-term payoffs rather than build long-term results’ (Henderson 2002:147). 
This leads me to propose the following hypothesis.  
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H1: Norwegian assistance to CSOs operating in North-West Russia encourages the CSOs 
to pursue short-term benefits over long-term development. 
By Norwegian assistance is understood Norwegian project funding as described in 
chapter 3. This can be measured by tracing the funding back to a Norwegian Ministry or 
the Barents Secretariat (see chapter 3.4.1). Operationalisations are also needed for the 
other terms in H1.  
Short-term benefits are seen as financial or material support covering Russian CSOs’ 
activities and expenses within the (short-term) project timeframe. The term can be 
measured by looking at the project components and the CSO’s emphasis on goals that are 
easily measurable. One such project component is report writing, which is normally 
undertaken as a part of the project evaluation. Much report writing indicates an emphasis 
on inputs on a small scale rather than on sustainable results, because reports tend to focus 
on easily measurable outcomes like budget and money spent to achieve short-term project 
goals. There is a focus on the product created from the money granted (Henderson 
2002:153). With the intention of having successful projects, the elements included in 
project proposals are likely to be measurable. Project components like seminars, trainings 
and publications are quantifiable and indicate significance and success if achieved in 
accordance with the project ideas.  
Another approach to short-term benefits is to measure financial gains that the CSO 
achieves through salary and other compensations for project work. Coverage of office 
expenses and technical equipment are other financial short-term benefits. There is also 
more information besides the purely financial figures that can indicate how the incentives 
of a CSO are directed towards short-term results. I can measure how many employees the 
CSO has or aims to have, and especially the number of specialised employees that are 
dedicated to administrative work without having any connection to the issues of the CSO 
(as opposed to volunteers working there on a purely idealistic basis).  
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Long-term development is understood as broader participation in civil society, stronger 
horizontal ties between CSOs (civil society networks) and more influence for CSOs on 
political decision making. In other words the term indicates developing a stronger civil 
society. This is indeed less tangible, and hence more difficult to measure. In accordance 
with Putnam’s theory on horizontal ties, networks of CSOs are perhaps the clearest sign 
of a long-term development. Since such networks can take many shapes, I will try to find 
as much information on this area as possible by applying open questions in the interviews 
about collaboration, trust and information sharing between CSOs as well as structured 
networks. Another part of the term is measured by the degree of voluntary work – the 
basis of the non-profit ideal behind civil society as a force separate from business and the 
government. To what extent is this applicable in a society where involvement in 
organisations is generally low? I believe that volunteer activity despite a general 
disinterest in participation can indicate a long-term dedication to a CSO’s issues.  
Furthermore, CSOs focusing on long-term development show a dedication to developing 
the community in which they operate on a long-term basis by focusing on local agendas, 
where local actors are trained to assist and teach other parts of the local population. In this 
way, a project initiated by foreign funding can develop into a local enterprise that lives on 
after the foreign actors retreat. Circulating alternative information to the public is an 
important part of this local perspective, so that people can develop their own opinions 
based on other information than that which is presented in the state controlled media. 
Influence on decision making is ultimately the major indicator as to whether the civil 
society actors aim for a long-term change or not. It can here be measured in the CSOs’ 
attempts at affecting either local or regional authorities’ decision making, since the CSOs 
by these attempts show that they are stretching for civil society to have a larger influence 
on the direction society is taking.  
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2.4.2 H2: Foreign funding, local competition 
One plausible reason for the current weakness of CSO networks in Russia is, as 
mentioned, that civil organisations did not emphasise networking and collaboration 
between themselves due to the Soviet legacy. Another, more micro oriented explanation 
blames the donor’s focus on internal CSO development and professionalisation for the 
same weakness of CSO networks. A narrow focus on internal matters rather than on 
external mobilisation in the population and between the CSOs in an area can lead to 
stagnation in the development of a functioning civic network that could influence politics 
and civic rights (Henderson 2002).  
Regional research on Russian CSOs made by Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom between 1998 
and 2000 support the weak network argument. Her findings indicate that even though 
foreign donors have invested heavily in communication networks among Russian CSOs, 
such communication is mostly simple information exchange and not concrete 
collaboration (Sundstrom 2006). I wish to find out whether this tendency towards weak 
CSO networking still seems to persist, or if the development during the past six years has 
altered the communication pathways between CSOs in North-West Russia, making them 
a more robust collaboration. 
Foreign grants to CSOs might also create further cleavages in local societies and within 
an initially weak CSO community (Schmidt 2005a:28). The aspect of the ‘new elite of 
civic activists’ (Henderson 2002:157) is directly tied into the effects of foreign democracy 
assistance through aid and funding to CSOs. Instead of spreading horizontal ties in 
Russian civic communities, the CSOs compete over the funding. This competitiveness 
can even make groups split up, as personal or issue conflicts within an organisation can 
cause group members to leave and establish their own organisation and separate 
partnerships with foreign funders (Henderson 2002:160). Grants provide an incentive for 
different factions of an organisation to split up and seek possibilities to obtain resources 
for themselves.  
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Who receives the foreign funding in the CSO community? Two characteristics of grant 
receiving CSOs stand out. One is that the organisations with the longest history of 
receiving foreign funding keep on receiving it (Henderson 2002:158). The other is that 
“Western-looking” Russian CSOs are targeted as prime receivers of Western funding 
(ibid.:161). CSOs with the most Western-oriented attitudes and agendas over time win the 
trust of the funders and thus their grants. Is this the case with Norwegian assistance to 
Russian CSOs? Since the Russian CSOs in my study in general primarily receive 
Norwegian funding, I prefer speaking of certain “Norwegian-oriented” rather than the 
more unwieldy “Western” agendas in this second hypothesis. 
H2: North-West Russian CSOs with a long history of Norwegian-oriented agendas 
receive the trust of the Norwegian funders and partners, creating a competition between 
the CSOs to adjust to Norwegian models of civil society activity.  
Norwegian-oriented agenda would imply the attitude that some values and aspects of life 
are better in Norway and Norwegian ways of handling society’s problems is seen as the 
better path to follow. In some ways there is a parallel to the more general “Western 
attitudes” here, as Norwegian society would capture many of the same ideas of, for 
instance, freedom of press and transparency of political decision making – characteristics 
of Western style liberal democracy.10 In addition to attitudes, an agenda also consists of a 
plan with certain goals. In a Norwegian-oriented agenda, these goals are consistent with 
Norwegian criteria of project cooperation and Norwegian models of civil society activity.  
Norwegian models of civil society activity – what does this imprecise term imply? I 
consider a deductive approach alone to yield little gain here. Since I will have access to 
Norwegian CSO actors, I will complete the operationalisation by asking them what kind 
of activity and norms they find characterise their civil society. The results of this will be 
 
10 In other big society issues Norwegian ways may differ from the major Western, e.g. in the case of gender representation in 
company boards and of the state-church relationship. 
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presented in the analysis in chapter 5.2.1. One obvious Norwegian model is, however, 
possible to present: the democratic organisation.  
This part of a Norwegian model of civil society activity is embodied in, and can be 
measured by the form that organisations take. Many are member based and rely on the 
members to use a democratic vote. Members could either elect a board that is entrusted 
with changing the statutes of the organisation, or the members gather in an annual 
meeting and vote directly on the statutes themselves. In Norway, the latter is the most 
common. In any case, the majority is meant to rule. In addition to this numeric side of the 
democratic organisation, it is also within a Norwegian tradition that it is deliberative; 
everybody has the right to be heard. The construction of a solid organisational structure 
based on democratic values, such as election by the members, represents a typical 
“organisation development project”.  
2.4.3 H3: Authorities and CSOs  
Regional research on foreign CSO assistance in Russia draws a line between the success 
of CSO assistance as civil society development and the acceptance of CSO activity in the 
local or regional political environment (Sundstrom 2006).11 In other words, the foreign 
donors and the Russian CSOs are more likely to succeed with their goals in a region 
where the political deputies and bureaucrats are supportive of a strong and fairly 
independent civil society sector. Norwegian organisations collaborating with and 
supporting Russian CSOs thus have a better chance of developing civil society’s voice in 
a region where the authorities are willing to listen.  
 
11 Sundstrom conducted her research prior to Putin’s centralising reforms. With less power to the regional authorities, the 
supposition has less weight. On the other hand regional authorities interact with the regional CSOs when it comes to legal matters 
and regional concerns that affect the interests of CSOs. The oblast administration still holds the key to many matters of CSO 
concern, even though the federal government has increased its influence over CSOs. 
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Russia’s regions have legislative provisions for state-civil society interaction, which 
according to Proskuryakova et. al. (2005) is sufficiently developed. At the regional and 
local levels influence of civil society on policy processes is somewhat more effective than 
on federal level (e.g. budget processes, human rights and social policy), although varying 
greatly from region to region (ibid.:4). How is it in North-West Russia? Indicators of 
formalised high-level interaction between CSOs and authorities are found in the Barents 
Cooperation. There are numerous projects with CSOs and authorities in the north-western 
regions, and there is established collaboration between Norwegian organisations and 
counties and the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regional authorities. In view of that, I 
outline my third and final hypothesis.  
H3: In North-West Russia a high level of cooperation between regional/local authorities 
and CSOs has a positive influence on the realisation of Norwegian-oriented agendas.  
Who are the local/regional authorities? First of all there is an important difference 
between local and regional authorities. I will briefly characterize the two, starting with the 
regional authority. Political responsibility in the Russian regions is divided between a 
legislative and an executive power; respectively the duma or sobranie (assembly) and the 
administration. The administration is led by a governor in the territorial (non-ethnic) 
federation subjects, in this case the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasts, and a president 
or glava respubliki (head of republic) in the ethnically defined subjects, like the republics 
of Karelia and Komi. Of the two powers the executive is by far the most powerful and 
influential even on legislation (Hønneland 2005:34). Hence, when talking about the 
regional authorities in this thesis, the regional executive powers are implied.   
Local self-government is carried out directly by the populace and/or via local self-
government bodies which are elected or appointed. In Murmansk city, Arkhangelsk city 
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and Apatity12 the local self government bodies are elected and the major is in control of 
the executive. Local authorities are therefore defined as the executive powers on the local 
level, implying the majors and their city administrations in the cases under scrutiny.  
Ultimately it is relevant to conceptualise high level of collaboration. I see this as the kind 
of interaction where the CSOs feel that they are not only trying to get in contact with and 
get positive response from the authorities, but that they effectively experience such 
contact and response. The channels can be both formal (hearings, meetings and other 
lobbying) and informal (personal contacts). Cooperation can involve general issues of 
interest or be incorporated in concrete projects. Typical low level cooperation would on 
the other hand be mere routine interaction or even flawed attempts to get positive 
attention drawn to specific issues. I will specify the content of CSO-government 
cooperation by asking the interviewees about their interaction with regional and local 
authorities.  
2.5 Chapter summary  
This chapter has summed up important features of Russian civil society, from the 
transition to a more democratic regime in the late 1980s. On grounds of theory accounted 
for in chapter 1, an imperative tie between an independent, functioning civil society with 
influence on political decision-making and democratic development is established. Based 
on prior research presented in this chapter, there is no evidence of such an independent 
and influential civil society in Russian history. Neither the current Russian civil society 
seems in condition to influence the state in such a way as to contribute to the 
consolidation of democracy. People’s sceptical attitudes towards CSOs and organisational 
life as an alternative way to influence politics further seems to hinder a strengthening of 
 
12 These three cities will be the central Russian areas of my research.  
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civil society, as does the lack of network mentality among the CSOs themselves. The 
strong presidential power seems to be set on controlling CSOs through state institutions 
and new laws. All of these factors, along with the weak start provided by Soviet legacy, 
contribute to the challenges that Russian civil society faces today.  
Another challenge for Russian democratic development through civil society participation 
is that a Russian understanding of democracy is advocated by Russian authorities, while 
most foreign funding of Russian CSOs is based on a “Western” understanding of 
democracy. Prior studies of foreign funding of Russian civil society actors have resulted 
in several negatively charged theories on the effects of such funding. Based on such 
theories I have set forth three hypotheses – two on different effects of Norwegian funding 
on North-West Russian CSOs, and one on the effects of the local/regional political 
environment on the prospects of achieving the Norwegian goals of developing a civil 
society through funding CSOs. In addition to drawing on civil society theories I have 
based my assumptions on characteristics pertaining to the Russian-Norwegian CSO 
collaboration in the Barents Region. This particular part of the Norwegian High North 
policy is the main subject of the next chapter.  
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3. Norwegian High North Policy 
The Government wishes to continue the support to the development of an open and 
democratic society in Russia. Such support will mainly be characterised by collaborative 
projects between Norwegian and Russian actors within media and the civil society. 
(Utenriksdepartementets fagproposisjon:2)13  
Norwegian High North policy and Russian-Norwegian cooperation is naturally 
intertwined because of the Russian-Norwegian border in the High North and the recent 
history that has shaped Norwegian policy towards Russia during and after the Cold War. 
In the following I will summarize some historic milestones and briefly sketch the content 
of what is known as the High North Strategy. The main part of this chapter is then 
dedicated to the part of the Strategy called the Project Cooperation Programme with 
Russia, under which one finds the subsidies to CSOs operating in and with North-West 
Russia. This is, as indicated by the initial quotation, the main channel for Norwegian 
support of democratic development in Russia. Finally I will bring in some wider 
perspectives on Norwegian civil society support through the question of self interest and 
the Norwegian CSOs’ role in politics through the Norwegian Model.  
3.1 1950s – 1991: Cold War issues  
I limit this brief historic overview to the issues that were of importance during and after 
the Cold War, in which Norway and the USSR were on opposite sides. Norway’s policy 
towards the USSR during the years of tension between NATO and the Warszawa Pact can 
be described as one of both reassurance and deterrence. On the one hand there was an 
attempt of stabilising relations in the region with Norwegian “politics of reassurance” and 
 
13 From the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ proposition to Norway's National Budget for 2007. 
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on the other hand Norway was cautious to engage in collaboration with the USSR without 
involving other Western powers. Self-imposed restrictions in the areas closest to the 
border illustrate this. For example, Norway did not permit other NATO countries to 
perform any military exercise activities east of the 24th longitude. At the same time 
Norway rejected closer collaboration with the USSR as late as in 1988, when there was a 
Soviet proposal of replacing the fishery “Grey-zone”14 in the Barents Sea with a 
permanent zone of collaboration (Hønneland 2005:15).  
The three main traditional issues of Norwegian High North policy were marine area rights 
and fishery administration in the Barents Sea, the question of Svalbard15 and the question 
of the USSR as a security threat  (Hønneland 2005:13). The latter is relevant here, 
because it clearly shows how the question of regional stability was important during the 
Cold War. Soviet military escalation on the Kola Peninsula was a trigger for the 
Norwegian “deterrence and reassurance” policy towards the USSR. When the imminent 
military threat disappeared along with the Soviet Union, so did the reason for the main 
content of Norwegian security policy in the north. The time had come for a new approach 
towards Russia – through regional cooperation.  
3.2 1990s: Regional cooperation  
Norway’s official policy towards Russia gradually changed after 1991. Although bilateral 
focus on fishery zones and nuclear security was preserved, the new focus expanded to 
include the relationship with Russia as part of something larger, namely the regional 
development in the High North. From 1993 to the end of the 1990s, the general Barents 
 
14 Due to discrepancy on the division of the Economic Zones the two countries established a temporary “grey zone” in 1978, 
which is still in force in 2007, where each country is responsible for its own actions, with the aim of protecting the fish stock in 
the area (Hønneland 2005:15). 
15 The Spitsbergen Treaty from 1920 gave Norway sovereignty of the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) islands, with certain restrictions, 
although both Norwegians and Russians resided and ran mining activity there. The administration of the sea area around the 
islands became a main question of conflict.  
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Cooperation, emphasising trade and business development between East and West in the 
area, was the main part of what was called the Norwegian High North policy (Hønneland 
2005:18).  
The concept of the BEAR, in which the Barents Cooperation takes place, was a 
manifestation of a new mindset opposing the Cold War separation in the northern areas. 
The idea was officially launched by Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Torvald 
Stoltenberg, at a meeting in Kirkenes in January 1993, and resulted in the Kirkenes 
Declaration aiming to enhance sustainable development and stability in the region. The 
Barents Cooperation became a platform of collaborative optimism after the tensions of the 
Cold War.16 Regional cooperation expanded based on the declaration’s eight central areas 
of collaboration: environment, economy, science and education, regional infrastructure, 
health, culture, native peoples, and tourism.  
Norway presented the relationship with North-West Russia as a natural and imperative 
part of the Barents Cooperation, although the perpetual central issues of fishery 
administration and security remained a bilateral affair. Nuclear security and other 
environmental issues in the Norwegian-Russian cooperation became important financial 
and symbolic issues of Norwegian High North policy during the 1990s, followed by a 
focus on the regional health programmes to prevent spreading of contagious diseases at 
the turn of the century (Hønneland 2005:18).  
Behind these somewhat idealistic issues there were basic security policy concerns. 
Stability in the northern areas was as mentioned the overall goal that could be reached by 
these various points of entry. Such a broad approach would secure a stable situation with 
 
16 On this platform there are two political levels; one is the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the other is the Barents 
Regional Council (BRC). BEAC consist of country members and BRC of county members. BEAC: Denmark, Finland, Island, 
Norway, Russia, Sweden and the EU-Commission. Nine additional countries have observer status.  
BRC: Nordland, Troms and Finnmark in Norway; Västerbotten and Norrbotten in Sweden; Lapland, Oulu and Kainuu in Finland; 
Murmansk, Republic of Karelia, Arkhangelsk, Republic of Komi and Nenets Autonomous Area in Russia; and representatives of 
the region’s three native peoples (sami, nenets, vesps). (The counties marked in italics were not included in BEAR from the very 
beginning.) 
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a neighbour that was still seen as a ‘sleeping bear’ that needed reassurance, even though 
the Cold War had ended (Hønneland 2005:170). In the following years the stabilising 
efforts were expanded through an intensified High North approach from the Norwegian 
government, in which democratic development in the north became one of the priorities.  
3.3 2003 – 2007: A new strategy  
Through the Barents Cooperation, the Government wants to strengthen the people-to-people 
cooperation between Norway and Russia, including engagement, information and democratic 
participation in civil society. (Plattform for regjeringssamarbeidet:6)  
The High North policy making was intensified in 2003, when the government expert 
group that was set to identify new challenges and possibilities for Norway in the High 
North published its results an official report (NOU 2003: 32). This was followed by 
White Paper nr 30 (2004–2005), that introduced the High North as a main focus area of 
Norwegian foreign policy. The overall goal remained the same – to secure political 
stability and sustainable development in the north (St. meld. nr 30 [2004–2005]). 
Nevertheless, as the above quotation from the political platform of the following 
government (2005-2009) shows, new focus areas concerning Russia were also set forth. 
After the main focus on oil, gas and marine resources, new highlights were people-to-
people cooperation, democracy, indigenous peoples and human rights. 
So far, the policy making on the field has peaked with the current government’s High 
North Strategy document dating from December 2006. The strategy sums up how 
Russia’s development in issues of rule of law, freedom of expression and human rights is 
important to Norway. It states how the economic, societal and political development in 
Russia ‘will be followed closely and measures adapted accordingly. We will maintain a 
candid dialogue with Russia and will be clear about Norway’s views on human rights, the 
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principles of the rule of law and political rights’ (Utenriksdepartementet 2006b:18). 17 
Furthermore the government states that ‘importance will also be attached to measures to 
encourage children and young people to take part in organisations, which will help to 
strengthen civil society and democracy in the region’ (Utenriksdepartementet 
2006b:41).18
Norwegian high-ranking officials and state policy documents demonstrate that the current 
policy clearly includes more or less careful critique of Russian domestic affairs. Such 
approaches are made particularly visible in speeches by the Norwegian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. The latest speech he made on the matter was in Bodø on 15 March this 
year. On this occasion Jonas Gahr Støre stated that Norway should have certain 
expectations to ‘a democratic member of the Council of Europe’ concerning respect for 
the principles of rule of law and human rights, and for the conditions of freedom of 
speech and democracy. In the same sentence he even mentions ‘unacceptable events with 
murder of journalists’ (Gahr Støre 2007).  
The road from policy to politics follows certain mechanisms. In this case, the policy on 
democracy as a stabilising force in the High North is mainly put into practice through the 
various forms of cooperation with Russia as with the other states in the BEAR. However, 
one mechanism differs from this pattern; i.e. the project cooperation programme with 
Russia. It was established in the early 1990s as part of the financial support for 
democratisation and economic and societal development in the former East Block 
countries (Hønneland 2005:53). Although Russia is now an economically potent 
democratic federation, that is to say, the main transition period seems to be over, 
Norwegian support canalised through this programme still remains significant.  
 
17 Extracts from the High North Strategy are quoted directly from the official English version of the document.  
18 E.g. the Barents Youth Cooperation Office (BYCO) in Murmansk, which I have interviewed as part of my data foundation, 
‘was set up to provide information and guidance for youth groups, organisations and networks that are working with cross-border 
youth projects in the Barents region’ (Utenriksdepartementet 2006b:41). 
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3.4 The Project Cooperation Programme 
The main objective with Norway’s project support to Russia is to contribute to the adaptation 
to democracy and a market economy. This happens through collaborative projects where 
knowledge transfer and competence development are central. North-West Russia is the area 
with top priority, with a particular emphasis on the Russian part of the Barents Region which 
receives ca. 75% of the funding. (Sandhåland 2006)   
Intentions of democracy support to Russia can partly be described in monetary terms. The 
budget allocation for project cooperation with Russia (the Project Cooperation) for 2007 
was 111.3 million Norwegian crowners (Utenriksdepartementet 2006a).19 This is thus the 
largest budget expense post of the four main areas of foreign policy focus in the High 
North, just above nuclear security, and far ahead of arctic collaboration and the Barents 
2020 research programme. The money is distributed to applicants whereby a wide variety 
of project grants are administered by specific Norwegian authorities: Barents regional 
projects through the Barents Secretariat; health and social projects through the Ministry of 
Health and Care Services; environment protection through the Ministry of Environment; 
education and research through the Centre for International Cooperation in Higher 
Education and the Research Council of Norway; small funding budgets by the embassy 
and consulates; and finally, the bundle “energy, business development, infrastructure and 
democracy development” through the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). 
The grants administered by the MFA in 2006 came to a total of 30.5 million Norwegian 
crowners (Sandhåland 2006). 
The main focus area within the Project Cooperation Programme is people-to-people 
cooperation through subsidies to the Barents Secretariat (Utenriksdepartementet 2006a). 
 
19 Since the focus on High North policy sharpened with the new Strategy in 2006, High North efforts got a proper budget chapter 
(chapter 118) with a post especially for the Project Cooperation with Russia (post 70). High North efforts was formerly placed 
under a more general chapter (chapter 197), and the Project Cooperation with Russia was a part of the more extensive project 
cooperation with Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia (the ‘SUS’ countries). It is thus problematic to compare this budget 
allocation over time. 
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Popular participation and project collaboration between civil society actors characterise 
the “people-oriented” aspect of this terminology used in current official Norwegian 
discourse. The official funding of these actors therefore becomes highly interesting as an 
expression of Norwegian investment in regional civil society development, both in North-
West Russia and in North Norway. Since my research question includes the elements 
“democracy promotion, democratic development and CSOs” I find it relevant to look into 
the MFAs administration of project funding for democratic development and the Barents 
Secretariat’s administration of Barents regional projects with the same objective.  
3.4.1 Civil society funding 
How is Norwegian support to civil society advocates generally organised? The model for 
Norway’s policies of peace work, conflict resolution and development aid (known as the 
Norwegian Model) can also be relevant for CSOs cooperating closely with the state on 
democracy enhancing projects outside the framework of pure aid policy. The Norwegian 
Model has actively been developed by the MFA since the early 1990s, and is based on 
close collaboration between Norwegian government, research institutions and CSOs. In 
addition to the collaborative aspect with civil society, the model presents Norway as an 
economically strong and experienced “peace worker” and negotiator with long-term will 
to assist and a good relationship with key international actors (Utenriksdepartementet 
2007a). The Norwegian aim of being a nation of peace and conciliation indicates a policy 
direction which embraces Norwegian contributions to civil society development in other 
countries. My intention is not to describe the model in detail nor to go into Norway’s 
peace and aid policies, but rather to show that there are more or less institutionalised 
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mechanisms for collaboration between government and CSOs that set a framework for 
government support of CSOs in close relation to the foreign policy.20  
How is Norwegian support to civil society advocates in North-West Russia organised? 
Although there are many paths to sponsorship, there are some main official roads that 
civil society actors can take to seek funding for their projects. The major road goes 
through the Project Cooperation described above. Since the means for this programme are 
defined on an annual basis in the National Budget, there is a policy of not giving 
guarantees for funding for more than one year. It is not normal to cover the entire project 
cost either, the applicants must show ability to contribute financially or supplement with 
funding from elsewhere. One can apply to the relevant ministries or to the Barents 
Secretariat, which administrates regional funds from the MFA. 
What is the difference between the MFA and the Barents Secretariat as supporters of civil 
society? A study of their guidelines and forms for grant applications points out more 
similarities than differences between them. As the main objectives and prioritised 
geographic and subject areas are derived from the same Project Cooperation, this is to be 
expected. In addition to the main goals, there are specific objectives for each application 
granted, as listed in the various grant agreements. These of course vary depending on the 
purpose and type of project, but there are some recurring features, such as developing 
voluntary organisations, building networks and influencing political decision making. 
Because the criteria for project grants make out an important underlying part of my first 
hypothesis, I will sketch the main criteria of the two grant givers based on their guidelines 
to the applicants.  
Main criteria for grants are closely tied in with the goals for the funding policy. The MFA 
has even put forward an official criterion that the applications should be in accordance 
 
20 Differences between development aid policies and foreign policies are seen as diminishing (Sande Lie 2006:140). After the 
reorganisation of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad, a directorate under the MFA) in April 2004, large 
parts of Norad’s responsibilities for long term development aid was incorporated in the MFA.  
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with the goals stated in the guidelines. For example, the collaboration aspect is covered 
by the criteria that partners have to prove that there is established cooperation before 
applying. The Barents Secretariat did not use to have this as a criterion, but as of March 
2007 it is implemented on grounds of enhancing the contact aspect of the collaborations.  
Democracy is a regular goal area under the label ‘Democracy and Human Rights’ in the 
MFAs guidelines. One of the goals is to ‘build a free press and develop free formation of 
opinion’ and another is ‘strengthening and securing rule of law and human rights and 
building timely and democratic structures for applying justice’ (Utenriksdepartementet 
2007b). Until 2007 The Barents Secretariat had solely followed its original five areas of 
priority when decisions on funding were made; i.e. industrial and commercial 
development, culture/welfare, environment/energy, education/competence and indigenous 
peoples. In the latest guidelines to grant applications (Barents Secretariat 2007) a new 
sixth area of priority has appeared in the list. This area is democracy. Interestingly, this 
sixth area is not quite in harmony with the oral data I have gathered on the issue.21  
Common criteria also appear in a list over initiatives that do not qualify for funding; i.e. 
all support is to be purely project based, so no grant goes to support of general operating 
expenses (such as rent, salary etc.), although it can go to start-up costs in an initial phase. 
Nor does any money go to research, marketing of goods or services, or establishment of 
businesses in Norway. Grants that are not used in accordance with the criteria can be 
withdrawn at any time.  
The main differences between the two grant programmes are that the Barents Secretariat 
has a regional focus whereas the MFA has a wider geographic focus. The Barents 
Secretariat is also characterised by its youth perspective, which is well developed with its 
 
21 In an interview with Thomas Nilsen, the Deputy General Secretary, I was told that some projects were hard to place in any of 
the five categories (such as the journalist collaboration and concrete democracy projects) and pure human rights projects were 
generally ruled out. I even asked if they were considering changing the categories of priority. The answer was no; they rather 
wanted to constrict them (Nilsen 2007 [interview]). Nilsen underlined nonetheless that the human rights idea is fundamental and 
lies behind all of the Barents Secretariat’s funding (Nilsen 2007 [interview]). 
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own project manager and project databases, aimed at ‘community development where the 
special needs of youth are given attention’ (Barents Secretariat 2007). Smaller differences 
are that the MFA specifically requests documentation of prior results, and directs the 
granting at Norwegian applicants.22  
3.5 Beyond funding 
An important dimension to development in the Barents Region has been Norwegian financial 
support to projects in Russia. Now we are seeing increasing debate about this policy. We will 
welcome that debate. Some people say that we should reorganise the policy. Russia is no 
longer a poor country, and we have to stop giving money, it is said. I do not share that 
critique. We are not running a money-gift policy. We are using the budget resources on that 
which benefits Norwegian interests, because it is good for Norway. (Gahr Støre 2007) 
This statement from a speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs points at a different 
perspective to project funding – that of Norwegian interests. In what ways are Norwegian 
interests served by Norwegian participation in the development of civil society and 
democracy in Russia? In a macro perspective people cooperating on a broad range of 
society issues create more regional stability, in accordance with the superior goal of the 
Barents Cooperation and the Norwegian government. On a micro level grounds for 
Norwegian business and other economic interests in North-West Russia and North 
Norway are developed by Norwegian presence, participation and building of trust and 
networks. I will not proceed into a market aspect here; it suffices to say however that it 
can account for an obvious incentive or a beneficial side effect of cooperation at the least. 
In stead I intend to lead the question in a more idealistic direction, i.e. that of the 
Norwegian understanding of democracy.  
 
22 In theory Russians are also welcome to apply directly to the MFA, but all the forms are in Norwegian. The Barents Secretariat 
operates with all forms in English.  
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In the two interviews I conducted with representatives directly involved in granting 
Norwegian official democracy support (Rune Aashein, Consul General in Murmansk, and 
Thomas Nilsen, Deputy General of the Barents Secretariat) variants of the question of 
Norwegian idealistic interests came up. I consider the answers to reflect of the official 
ideas behind Norwegian support of civil society actors in North-West Russia. Both 
representatives emphasise the importance of acknowledging the differences between 
Norwegian and Russian society for collaboration in civil society projects for democracy 
development. The goal is that the Norwegians show their experience and knowledge to 
the Russians, which they then can adapt to their own perceptions and realities. The 
Consul General concretises the term ”democracy support” with the support of projects 
that lead to more openness in Russia.  
More openness cultivates what we see as democracy in everyday life. For instance public 
hearings, though they are what the Russians call pokazukha; a showcase. Still they have 
moved on towards more openness in society, in line with our understanding of openness. But I 
doubt that it will be like it is in Norway. (…) Much of what we do is to give Russia help to 
self-help and show that collaboration is useful for all partners. It is a win-win situation that is 
also important for the idea of democracy; in opposition to the zero-sum game that is ingrained 
here. It will lead to changes of attitudes over time (Aasheim 2007 [interview]). 
It is accordingly not a goal to transfer a Norwegian understanding of democracy. Yet 
there is emphasis on what is seen as the less favourable sides of Russian democracy from 
a Norwegian perspective. A change in attitude towards a more “Norwegian” idea of 
openness and inclusiveness of civil society in governmental decision making is the best 
case scenario. Aasheim defines democratic rights in line with this view: ‘that the civil 
society, through organisations etc, can participate in shaping decisions in society’ 
(Aasheim 2007 [interview]). Thomas Nilsen also connects the same components, and 
adds that the centralisation of Putin weakens development of democracy, because it 
increases the distance between decisions and the general population (Nilsen 2007 
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[interview]). The understanding of CSOs as bridge-makers between the public and 
government is evident in both interviews.  
According to the Norwegian Model this is the prevailing understanding of government-
CSO cooperation and funding in Norway. Both government and CSOs heavily underline 
that mechanisms for funding and collaboration between Norwegian government and 
Norwegian CSOs are characterised by a fundamental independence. It is, however, 
debatable (and often debated) to what extent one can speak of independence with such 
intense interaction between state and CSOs. The strong financial support flowing to the 
CSOs implicates a significant economic dependence, but there is also a strong political 
influence going the other way. CSOs are dependent on projects financed by the state and 
the state is dependent on the CSOs work to implement its policy (Sande Lie 2006:147).23 
Borders between civil society and state actors easily become blurred in such a model. 
When the CSOs follow the state’s guidelines for project collaboration with Russia as well 
as more specific project criteria, they simultaneously take over part of the state’s policies 
and transform it into action; in other words, into politics. In the analysis in chapter 5 I will 
look into how Norwegian democracy support is carried out by the Norwegian CSOs and 
discuss how the grant criteria of the government influence the funding criteria of the 
CSOs to Russian civil society actors.  
3.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter I have given a brief historic overview over the important subjects in 
Norwegian High North policy to Russia, from the Cold War’s “politics of deterrence and 
reassurance” until today’s new High North Strategy. I have focused on Norwegian 
funding of civil society actors in Norway and Russia through the Project Cooperation, 
with the intention of clarifying the financial and political background on which 
 
23 For further discussion about this subject, see Sande Lie (2006) pp. 138-164. 
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Norwegian democracy assistance to Russia is based. The comparison between the 
guidelines of the MFA and the Barents Secretariat points to a collective policy idea in 
which criteria for democracy support seem to be increasingly streamlined. Finally, I 
discuss some aspects of Norwegian interests in developing Russian civil society and 
democracy, and place this in the more general framework of state-CSO cooperation in the 
Norwegian Model. Further questions regarding state influence on CSOs are transported to 
the main analysis in chapter 5. The strategy that leads to this analysis will be presented in 
the next chapter.  
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4. Research strategy 
This case study is based on multiple sources of information and methods of data 
collection, including semi-structured interviews, questionnaires, primary document study 
and secondary literature study – all providing different perspectives on democratic 
development in North-West Russia and Norwegian involvement in such. A research 
strategy does, however, contain more than the data foundation and the methods of 
collecting data; also it includes the relevant investigative questions, propositions, and 
methods of analysis (Yin 1994:20). Propositions found in my hypotheses and research 
question guide the way to relevant questionnaire- and interview questions. Subsequently, 
the same propositions are the starting point for coding and analysing data in a software 
programme designed for qualitative analysis.  
The reason for using a qualitative approach in this thesis is twofold. Firstly, qualitative 
methodology allows the researcher to explore an individual’s experience of a 
phenomenon and subsequently draw conclusions from this. Since all my hypotheses aim 
to measure subjective perception as well as facts, I choose to conduct qualitative 
interviews. They reach deeper into the respondents’ world of understanding and retrieve 
subjective information, in contrast to the questionnaires and documents that mainly 
provide background information and facts. Secondly, Norwegian project funding to 
Russian CSOs has not been widely studied, thus I start out with little information about 
the subject. A wide approach that includes dialogue with open-ended questions and 
subjective information helps me to understand more of the phenomenon I am studying. 
According to Repstad (1993), qualitative methods are commonly used to cast light on 
subjects that have not been extensively researched. However, there are methodological 
shortcomings in the use of qualitative methods. The prospect of generalisation is one such 
problem. Another is structuring the collected data in order to construct a reliable analysis. 
These subjects will be touched upon in the following sections, in light of experiences 
from this study and as part of the overall research strategy.  
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4.1 Narrowing down the research 
Limitations are necessary to narrow down the field of research to the essence: How are 
civil society organisations in North-West Russia influenced by Norwegian support? The 
subjects that I have chosen to concentrate on are the ones I consider most relevant to this 
question and to the hypotheses, as well as to civil society and democratisation theory. 
This of course results in some limitations in need of more concrete explanation, starting 
with the limitation of primary sources of information; the organisations that were 
interviewed and the documents that were analysed.  
The official documents limit themselves, since documents relevant to Norwegian funding 
of Russian civil society are scarce. I use the High North Strategy, the National Budget (St. 
prp. nr. 1 [2006-2007]), and the MFA’s recommendations to this, as well as the “Soria 
Moria” declaration of the current government (Plattform for regjeringssamarbeidet). 
These documents explain goals of Norwegian democracy promotion as part of the High 
North policy. To find official criteria for funding of CSOs I compare the guidelines to 
project granting by the MFA and the Barents Secretariat under the Project Cooperation 
with Russia. As indicators of how funding routine is structured to include such criteria, I 
also study the application forms of the MFA and the Barents Secretariat as well as two 
project approvals and a project report that were made available by the MFA.24 Possible 
Russian documents about Norwegian funding of CSOs are not included in this study due 
to the simple fact that I cannot read nor find them. This weakens the variation of the data 
basis. I nevertheless find it defensible to focus solely on Norwegian official documents, 
since my aim is to study the effects of Norwegian policy on civil society actors.  
Organisations that were actively involved in civil society projects with Norwegian 
funding through the Barents Secretariat and the MFA between the years 2000 and 2007 
 
24 These are project approvals of the Norwegian Association for Persons with Developmental Disabilities (NFU) and Bellona, and 
a project report from the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and the Women’s Congress of the Kola Peninsula (CWKP).  
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were included in the selection of CSOs to be studied. The timeframe was chosen firstly 
because the project databases I used for selection were not well developed before the year 
2000. Secondly, the interval contains the political and societal development under one 
Russian president. In 2000 there was a political shift in Russia with Vladimir Putin – and 
this is when I start to look at project collaboration. The timeframe ends at the point the 
interviews were done, in early 2007. A study of the development of state policies under 
the same political leader avoids spurious effects of changing presidencies on the societal 
developments I have set out to investigate.  
I primarily used the project databases of the Barents Secretariat to select the relevant 
CSOs. The MFA also provided me with a project list of some 53 funded CSOs, both 
Russian and Norwegian between 2000 and 2006 (Rendahl 2006), but the MFA had no 
overview of all government funded CSOs. Additional projects might be funded by 
different ministries. Due to restrictions of time for research as well as poorly coordinated 
data of projects funded in the various ministries, I did not include such additional projects 
in the selection. 
Further informants were found through the Barents Institute and the Centre for Russian 
Studies at NUPI. A couple of CSOs were located through snowball sampling after the 
initial selection had been made. In these cases Norwegian CSO actors tipped me about 
contacts and gave me valuable access to Russian actors previously unknown to me. The 
organisations selected had all participated in one or more projects that had a direct 
connection or appeal to democratic development or to development of civil society 
including the aspect of democratisation in the region. 
A selection of organisations involved in projects with a clear democratisation purpose – 
such as enhancing knowledge of indigenous peoples rights or youth organisation 
development – represents the organised civil society forces that I set out to investigate. 
Due to the lack of a clear subject division in the project databases at the time of case 
selection, I made a “democratisation” category myself based on the project descriptions. 
The majority of these organisations were involved in environmental, indigenous peoples, 
50 
 
                                             
education/competence and culture related issues. A variety of different organisations has 
democratisation objectives and I consider the heterogeneity of the CSOs to be embedded 
in this variety. However, project descriptions can deviate from reality. Also, there are 
different understandings of democracy and how it is best developed, and project 
descriptions are likely to be based on distinct definitions. This is a weakness in my way of 
selecting cases, and I have taken this into consideration when making the interview 
questions by asking about the respondent’s understanding of democracy and civil society.  
The research is furthermore restricted by geographic boundaries, defined in chapter 1 as 
the Russian part of the Barents region consistent with the official Norwegian definition. 
Since most of the Russian CSOs that collaborate with Norwegian actors within my frame 
of study are located in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, and I had limited possibilities of 
finding relevant CSOs in other regions, the geographic area of study is restricted to these 
two regions.25 In addition, the CSOs in Moscow represent a broader view on North-West 
Russian civil society development. They have projects in many of the Russian regions, 
including Nenets, Karelia, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The Norwegian organisations 
involved in project activity in North-West Russia are located in Murmansk, the three 
northern counties of Norway and in Oslo. 
Practical research restrictions of budget and timeframe also matter to the quality and 
quantity of collected data. The budget allowed me to visit relevant places, but the 
timeframe for the research trip restricted the time spent on each interview. Moreover, the 
interviewees’ own schedule mostly also imposed restrictions on time spent on an 
interview.26 Finally, limitations are necessary for terms used in hypotheses and research 
questions, in other words, there is a need for operationalisation. These are made 
throughout the thesis as the relevant terms appear, initially with the development of the 
hypotheses in chapter 2.4.  
 
25 I found one relevant CSO that operated in Karelia too, but I did not manage to establish contact.   
26 Consequently I spent an average time of two hours (from one hour to a day) with the people I interviewed. 
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4.2 Data collection  
After establishing which organisations still existed or were reachable in other ways, I 
ended up with 20 Russian and 25 Norwegian CSOs which I contacted by e-mail. Of these 
I received positive responses from 15 Russian and 17 Norwegian CSOs. A big Russian 
actor like the Red Cross simply cut me out after my contact there suddenly quit her job in 
the organisation.27 Except for the Red Cross I ended up actually interviewing all the 
Russian CSOs that had responded to my initial request, and 14 of the Norwegian CSOs.28 
In other words, I contacted all the relevant units (i.e. the ones within the set geographic- , 
time- and subject boundaries) that I found in the project protocol of the Barents 
Secretariat and through the MFA. A validity problem arises when not all the relevant 
organisations in the region were included in the initial base of selection. There might be 
more organisations financed through official Norwegian funding than I found, since 
Norwegian counties and individual cities also have project collaborations with Russian 
actors, and other ministries than the MFA probably fund projects with motives of 
developing civil society.  
Purely by chance, I made contact with the oblast administration in Murmansk. Originally 
I did not have expectations of getting interviews with Russian officials, but since I had an 
appointment with the leader of the regional public affairs office in her parallel role as 
leader of a CSO network, I expanded my focus. I lack information from the Arkhangelsk 
administration due to no such opportunity there; I had no prior contacts in the 
administration and little time to build up my network. Consequently, there is a difference 
in sources between the two main regions in my study.  
The field work was conducted in eleven cities in Norway and Russia in January, February 
and March 2007. In the three northern counties of Norway I visited the towns Kirkenes, 
 
27 I later found out that communication difficulties with Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Red Cross are nothing out of the ordinary 
even for their Norwegian partner (Ottar Kvaal 2007[Interview]). 
28 Due to practical restrictions of time and travel I could not follow up three of the positive Norwegian responses.  
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Alta, Tromsø, Bardufoss and Bodø, as well as the capital Oslo. In North-West Russia I 
visited Murmansk, Apatity and Arkhangelsk, as well as St. Petersburg and the capital 
Moscow. I conducted a total of 33 interviews with different representatives of Russian 
and Norwegian CSOs, the Barents Secretariat, the Norwegian Consul General and the 
regional administration in Murmansk.  
4.2.1 The interviews  
I sent the organisations standardised questions by e-mail,29 aiming to retrieve basic and 
background information about the organisations and their activities and standpoints. This 
was followed by field research where a set of more loose, open ended questions formed 
the basis for semi-structured interviews to complete the data collection. The two-step 
interview was originally based on the idea that the first questionnaire would serve as a 
pointer to the relevant questions in the following interview and consequently as a way of 
making the most of the face-to-face time. There are two versions of both questionnaires 
and interview guides, one version for the Russian and one for the Norwegian CSOs 
(appendices B-E). Questions for the Barents Secretariat and the MFA are separate, as they 
have a distinct focus on Norwegian policy.  
One great advantage with semi structured interviews is that they can be altered in 
accordance with conversational dynamics. They also give the researcher a chance to learn 
from her own mistakes and new information gathered along the way. Such responsive 
interviewing (Rubin and Rubin 2005:35) improves the questions and follow ups to 
spontaneous statements, feelings and information that arise during the interview. This 
flexibility is important for the in-depth study, in which I use interviews as a tool. 
 
29 A Norwegian form was sent to the Norwegian CSOs and both a Russian and an English version to choose from to the Russian 
CSOs. The Russian questionnaire is longer than the Norwegian one, as I had more standardised questions in mind for the 
Russians.  
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Settings for the interviews were generally the interviewees’ offices, on a few occasions 
we met in cafés and hotel lounges, once the interviewee took me in as a guest in her 
home, and once I did a phone interview. I mention this to underline the importance of a 
setting for the feeling of control that the interviewee will have over the interview 
situation. A more relaxed interviewee is generally a more open one. The phone interview 
gave me less information due to the lack of observation, but the conversational flow was 
excellent and I could typewrite the entire conversation. I chose to use notes in stead of a 
recorder for three reasons: firstly, listening to recordings is extremely time consuming, 
secondly, taking notes allows unnoticed commenting on situations, observations, moods 
etc., and thirdly, I am familiar and comfortable with taking notes from interviews. After 
each interview I transcribed the notes as soon as possible to take advantage of a fresh 
memory.  
The questions were crafted to capture different aspects of the hypotheses, with the 
intention of using the answers as evidence of verification or falsification. For example, 
question 6 in the questionnaire to the Norwegians (appendix C) captures the initial 
tendencies included in H1 regarding encouragement for short-term benefits.30 The four 
parts of the question constitute part of the operationalisation of “short-term benefits”. A 
more in-depth complement to this superficial question is found in the interview guide’s 
question 2b31 (appendix E). The same logic applies in the Russian questions: H3, on 
CSO-government cooperation, is in this way partly investigated by asking for yes/no to 
questions 23-2732 (appendix B). In the interview, this was followed up by asking a locally 
relevant question like 16: ‘How does your organisation consider its influence on local 
political decision-making, for instance on the establishment of a youth parliament?’33 
 
30 Does your organisation emphasise: a) Rapid results from your partner? b) Reports/evaluations from your partner? c) Seminar 
attendance? d) Anything else in the cooperation?  
31 What does your organisation expect from the collaboration?  
32 E.g. question 25: Does your organisation invite politicians or representatives of governmental authorities on meetings etc.? 
33 The last part was always exemplified with an actual local political issue; the youth parliament was a case I used on a youth 
NGO in Murmansk.  
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Such a division of questions with the same analytical logic in two distinct settings also 
serves as a reliability check on coherence between the same respondent’s answers given 
at two different points in time.  
Pre-tests were made to secure the relevance and comprehensiveness of the content and the 
form and layout of the questions. Three Norwegian CSOs34 gave feedback on the first 
drafts of the Norwegian questions and one Russian civil society researcher 35 gave 
extensive feedback on the Russian questions. In addition, my supervisor and the Barents 
Institute gave feedback on several versions of all questions.  
Finally, an imperative ethical consideration when handling interview data is to seek 
informed consent. I gave all the interviewees information about the purpose and public 
character of my thesis, and they were offered the possibility to be anonymous if desired. 
None of the interviewees took me up on this offer. I therefore refer to the true names of 
my sources when quoting them, which simultaneously enhances the trustworthiness of the 
data. Nevertheless, at times I consider the possible consequences of statements to be 
potentially harmful to the interviewees, and thus in such cases, I opt to leave out direct 
references.  
4.3 Criteria of quality  
The frequently used quality criteria in social sciences are validity and reliability. These 
terms are controversial in qualitative research and often criticized for attempting to 
achieve an artificial consensus about a simulated uniform reality (Ryen 2002:176-177). 
Reliability criteria are difficult to consider because it is impossible to replicate the exact 
same qualitative research and hence check the trustworthiness of the data presented 
 
34 These were Bellona, the Human Rights House and NPA.  
35 Tatiana Barandova from St.Petersburg Humanitarian and Political Science Center “Strategy”. 
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(Dalen 2004:102-104). Alternative quality criteria have been elaborated in qualitative 
research tradition, replacing conventional quantitatively oriented terms. Lincoln and Guba 
(1985:300) provide alternatives that can be more logical in qualitatively directed research; 
i.e. credibility as an alternative to internal validity, transferability as opposed to external 
validity, dependability in stead of reliability and confirmability rather than objectivity. 
Using a typical quantitative quality criterion like reliability makes little sense when there 
is no mechanism for estimation of one true score. Perhaps the term dependability, in 
accounting for the ever-changing context within which research occurs, provides a better 
alternative? Without entering too deeply into discussions of terminology, I will point out 
some quality criteria for my own research and some problems of dependability and 
validity that I encountered.   
The underlying relationship between civil society and democratic development, and 
between CSOs and the development of democratic values in society, are discussed in the 
sections on civil society theory in chapter 1. Civil society theory clearly claims that civil 
society activism and activity are beneficial for democracy. The validity of this research 
does however depend on the accuracy of such a connection of phenomenon in the area of 
study. The little research on civil society issues in North-West Russia does indeed 
indicate that the same general connection exists between civil society activism and 
democratic development in North-West Russia (Barandova 2007).  
For this thesis to have scientific value, I have to be quite confident that I am in fact 
measuring the phenomenon that I set out to investigate, namely implications of 
Norwegian funding to North-West Russian CSOs as perceived by the involved actors. 
There must be a link between theory and reality, and this is described by so-called 
construct validity (Yin 1994), which involves generalising the operational measures for 
the concepts in my question and hypotheses to the actual concepts I claim to be studying. 
Does the observed reality correspond with the theoretical assumptions on which I base my 
research? This is the train of thought running through the analysis in chapter 5, where I 
continuously test the theoretical assumptions by breaking data into operational measures 
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in a coding scheme and putting them back together in theoretical context. The 
conceptualisation needed for such a scheme was already set when I outlined the interview 
guides and the questions, since they made me specify what I thought about the constructs 
in my study.  
External validity, on the other hand, implies that the findings of my study can be 
analytically generalised (Yin 1994:33), i.e. they are applicable in other contexts or with 
other subjects. Because analytical generalisation strives to generalise a particular set of 
results to broader theory, I should test my hypotheses through replication on several cases 
(Yin 1994:36). Given that I have accessed about twice the amount of informants than 
initially expected, I have about twice as many cases forming the data material as 
originally planned. The consequences of basing the study on more cases are a broader 
data foundation and a more representative selection of the CSOs in the Russian and 
Norwegian Barents Region. The large number of civil society actors and funders 
interviewed actually makes my study into less of a clear cut case study and warrants 
limited generalisations and quantifications of data. Within the limitations of time and 
space the findings could be applicable to other Russian CSOs receiving Norwegian 
funding for activity that aim to enhance democratic values, but they cannot be generalised 
to Russia as a whole, nor to Norwegian democracy development policy in other areas of 
the world.  
A disturbing data quality problem that I face occurs in the data collection process and 
concerns the way the actors I study perceive me and my intentions. The problem is related 
to the simple fact that I am a Norwegian student researching Norwegian funding and 
receivers of such. On top of that, I am collaborating with the Barents Institute, which is 
closely connected to the Barents Secretariat,36 which evaluates project proposals and 
decides which projects are to be financed. I might get more restricted or even adapted 
 
36 They both have offices in the same building in Kirkenes and both the Secretariat and the Institute are heavily financed by the 
MFA. 
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answers from both the Russian and the Norwegian CSOs that depend on this funding. If a 
totally independent researcher from a different country were to do the same study, she 
might get different answers to some key questions. This is a problem of trustworthiness in 
the interview data that I have tried to avoid by explaining how I am in fact an independent 
researcher, and asking directly how the interviewees perceive my role. On the other hand, 
my collaboration with the Barents Institute might also have been positive for me in way 
of the respondents’ interest in answering the first questionnaire and agreeing to meet me 
for an interview. My own background seems to be a double-edged sword.  
4.3.1 Quality of interviews  
Problems of validity and dependability can appear when using an interpreter in the 
interview situation. I was assisted in a total of three interviews by two different 
interpreters, both connected to the Barents Secretariat’s offices in Murmansk and 
Arkhangelsk respectively. The fact that they work in these offices enhances the 
previously described problem, as I am hereby even more connected with the Barents 
Secretariat. Especially two situations that I experienced illustrate how the use of an 
interpreter can cause validity problems: One interpreter consequently translated into third 
person, so that I cannot always distinguish whether the interviewee is talking about 
herself or if she is in fact referring to a third person. I did not notice this soon enough for 
all confusion to be ruled out. The other interpreter mingled into the conversation and tried 
to help me by fishing for an answer when the interviewee was reluctant to give one.  
Language-related problems of course also appeared. The word “challenge” is frequent in 
questions about actor relations, and this word is not commonly used in this manner in 
Russian. Russians rather perceive this as “problem” and hence misunderstand the 
question as something purely negative. I discovered this in an early stage, and could add 
explanations to questions of “challenges”. Other errors occurred because of language as 
well. I used a translator in Kirkenes to translate the questionnaires and the Russian 
answers to them. I found out that the word “political” had been included in the translation 
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of question 27 in the Russian questionnaire. This somewhat alters the meaning of the 
question, especially since “political” is a trigger word for many CSOs in Russia.  
In an interview situation it is important to take the interviewees’ expectations and reasons 
for meeting me into consideration as well as my own expectations. The interviewees were 
bound to have a selection of information that they wanted to tell me, especially since they 
had already received topic directions in the questionnaire. Such selectiveness could imply 
exclusion of data that they felt was unimportant or even direct avoidance of some 
sensitive data. I therefore try to be aware of what was not responded to and what was not 
asked, and why. A theme that remained inaccessible to me is the competition between 
Russian civil society actors over foreign funding. I will come back to this in the analysis.  
4.4 Data analysis method 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) is the space where I organise 
data. I use the software programme Nvivo7, to structure the project material in such a way 
that I am able to analyse the data in detail and context. It facilitates coding of text and 
handling annotations, memos, connections, matrices and queries in and of the material. I 
base my coding scheme on the components of my hypotheses and on new key subjects 
noted during the research.  
Rubin and Rubin (2005:244) emphasize that responsive interviewing is not about how 
many times a concept appears, but rather about the strength of the evidence on which it 
depends. I do not use software for word and concept counting since this sort of text 
analysis fails to capture the contextual relevance of words and phrases. There are a 
multitude of other functions that I ignore simply because they are irrelevant to my 
purpose of using the programme, namely to achieve data structure to organise facts and 
tendencies in a handy analytic overview. Orienting in the jungle of interviews, 
questionnaires, memos, notes and documents requires a conceptual map, and this is what 
the software assists me in making. Ultimately my own evaluations lead me to meaningful 
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data by following the structures I make in the programme. Computer programmes that 
automate statistical analysis, like SPSS, are different in the sense that they actually carry 
out the analysis, for example, of a multiple regression, for the researcher. CAQDAS is not 
suited for such operations. It merely facilitates quantifications by encouraging systematic 
coding and automatic search for strings according to the implemented coding.  
In the end, my entire project is stored in one virtual space, which facilitates not only my 
analysis structure, but also the possibilities for others to check my entire work (appendix 
F). Checking conformability and testing dependability becomes more feasible with simple 
access to all research documents and notes, as well as to the line of thought behind the 
analysis embedded in the coding and the enquiries made in the programme.  
4.5 Chapter summary 
In this chapter I have outlined the methods used to select and locate sources and to collect 
and analyse data. The research strategy is based on a deductive approach to the data, 
which is collected by a triangulation of qualitative methods of semi-structured interviews 
and primary document analysis with quantitative questionnaires. Several limitations 
restrict the research and are necessary for a clear focus on the geographic areas, time, 
subjects and actors that are relevant to the guiding question. A description of the 
fieldwork and the interview technique accounts for the methods of data collection.  
Moreover, I have presented a number of quality criteria for methods and data, and, to 
some extent, discussed them in light of my own experiences. Particularly problems of 
confidence between interviewer and interviewee and of the researcher’s independence 
from Norwegian financers have been highlighted. Finally, I have presented CAQDAS as 
a data structuring tool that facilitates the analysis of data in context. In the next chapter I 
will lay out and discuss the results of the data-assisted analysis in light of theory and 
assumptions.  
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5. Crossing assumptions  
In this chapter I aim to discuss data analysed in relation to the three initial hypotheses 
described in chapter 2. The general tendencies and the deviant cases will be exemplified 
with interview quotations of civil society actors in Norway and North-West Russia. A 
discussion of the theoretical hypotheses’ validity and relevance to the empirical reality 
follows throughout the chapter.  
In the first section I will set the scene of how Norwegian democracy support is carried out 
by discussing how the grant criteria of the Norwegian government influence the 
partnership criteria of the Norwegian CSOs. Next, I weigh the evidence from interviews 
and guidelines against H1, before reaching a conclusion. In the second section a 
discussion of the importance that CSOs’ history and agendas have for cooperation and 
competition will lead to conclusions regarding H2. The third section is dedicated to 
CSOs’ interactions with Russian authorities and subsequent implications for H3. I will 
also introduce some new aspects that cast light on the guiding question of how Norwegian 
democracy promotion influences advocates of democratic development.  
5.1 In the wake of funding  
Following the neo-institutional line of thought presented by Henderson in chapter 2.4, I 
expected to find Russian CSOs that were encouraged by their Norwegian partners and 
funders37 to pursue short-term benefits in projects over long-term civic development. To 
evaluate this hypothesis properly, I have to measure the criteria for funding and the 
 
37 The word partner is mostly preferred by both the Norwegian and the Russian civil society actors, in stead of a more 
differentiating word like funder. I will use partner when referring to the collaborating CSOs and funder when referring to grant 
giving foundations, ministries or other government authorities, the Barents Secretariat or private grant givers.  
  61  
 
expectations of Norwegian partner CSOs as well as the content of prior projects that have 
been funded through a Norwegian partner.  
I tried to spot incentives to short-term gains and long-term commitment by asking 
questions deducted from the hypotheses as operationalised in chapter 2.4. It is of course 
likely that most interviewees would answer in such a way that would make their 
organisation appear as long-term focused as possible. The general impression I got from 
questionnaires, interviews, observations, applications and reports was nevertheless that 
although there are economic incentives to be expected in the third sector, the people who 
work in voluntary organisations certainly do not do so to become rich. There is always an 
idealistic motivation to improve society for the present and for future generations.  
The so-called “grant game” that Henderson (2002) had in mind quickly became clear to 
me as I talked with Russian and Norwegian CSO-representatives. There is almost no 
funding from Russian government or private sponsors, and most of the CSOs that 
collaborate with foreign organisations have foreign funding as the only significant source 
of income. In this picture short-term payoffs are essential as a way to survive as an 
organisation and as employees. This has, however, nothing to do with the fundamental 
wish to make a real difference in a long-term perspective. The frontier between incentives 
for short-term results and long-term progress is therefore anything but clear-cut. 
5.1.1 Criteria and expectations 
The MFA and the Barents Secretariat have guidelines for funding through the Project 
Cooperation with Russia as outlined in chapter 3.4.1. The Norwegian CSOs that apply 
through the MFA and the Barents Secretariat must of course consider these funding 
institutions’ criteria. In addition they have criteria of their own in relation to the Russian 
partners, which vary greatly depending on the type of organisation and their particular 
aims. Some partners have strict criteria, others are not aware that they have any. A 
multitude of topics are considered fundamental for funding and collaboration by the 
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different organisations.38 I will here introduce the most frequent criteria, i.e. report 
writing, seminar attendance, and shared values.  
All the Norwegian CSOs but Troms Red Cross expect consistent feed back from the 
Russian partners, in form of reports or evaluations. Why are reports important? There can 
be formal reasons for this, specifically that reports are demanded from the funder. Often 
the Norwegian CSO writes the final report to the MFA or the Barents Secretariat on 
behalf of both partners in the project. These final reports also serve a purpose; they point 
to problem areas and they can even be a way of improving funding criteria. Whether the 
organisation in fact reports on all the difficulties they experience is, however, uncertain. 
After all, they depend on yearly rounds of applications and acknowledgments before 
more funding is secured, considering that the amount of the Project Cooperation is 
established each year in the national budget.  
The CSOs are also quite unanimous about the need for participation in specific project 
seminars or courses. All partners but two emphasise project seminars, often because 
seminars can facilitate communication between the attendants and make way for 
exchange of knowledge. What the CSOs do not directly say, is that seminars may be 
preferred because they are easily reachable goals. This is not to say that arranging a 
seminar is easy, but rather that it is a goal that can easily be turned into a concrete result, 
and accounted for as a success in a final project evaluation to the MFA or the Barents 
Secretariat.  
Contrasting concrete results are values of reliability and responsibility in a partnership. 
Although not actual criteria for funding, these values were mentioned as decisive qualities 
in a partner, thus they can easily decide whether funding goes on or not. An established 
 
38 Topics mentioned by the CSOs were volunteer work, attendance in specific seminars or courses, specific results, reports, prior 
experience with project work and foreign partners, personal contact, the establishment of a democratic organisational structure, 
legal operation, grassroots origin, international focus, local focus, networks with local government and other CSOs, influence in 
society, communication, work with specific issues, and more universal qualities like responsibility for and activity in the project 
and an aim for changing society. 
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partnership is as mentioned in chapter 3.4.1 a criterion for funding from both the MFA 
and the Barents Secretariat. The value of trust as a foundation for continuity in a 
partnership is embedded in such a criterion.  
There is not always a complete overlap between the official Norwegian criteria and the 
various criteria of the partners. Inconsistency with the government’s guidelines indicates 
that the independence which CSOs claim from government policies does to some degree 
exist, despite the close state-CSO collaboration in the Norwegian Model described in 
chapter 3. Operational support is an area of repeated discrepancy, as shown in the 
following quote by a representative of Natur og Ungdom (NU). She also expresses 
discontentment with the focus on efficiency and result orientation that the projects must 
be based on in order to achieve funding. 
Project support is the trend. It is no longer possible to get operational support. But it is 
important for democratic organisational development, so we want to support operation costs 
as well. We also support one permanent position. Projects have to be so apolitical; nobody 
wants to approve a project with political content. Efficiency is furthermore not always 
possible, but it is efficiency that projects are based on. (Martinussen 2007 [interview]) 
So far the Norwegian actors that supply funding have shown that they have some criteria 
and expectations of their partners and of how funding is to be used. The most frequent 
criteria of the Norwegian CSOs seem to follow the guidelines of the MFA and the Barents 
Secretariat, although not in all cases. The next step towards a verification or falsification 
of H1 is looking into how the projects and partnerships are structured and how the CSOs 
emphasise long- and short-term components. 
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5.1.2 Long-term development 
Horizontal networks of civic engagement within the Russian CSO environment are a sign 
of long-term development.39 Information sharing between the Russian CSOs in the study 
appears to be rather scarce. Since collaboration among the actors in civil society will be a 
reoccurring theme in the discussion of the next hypothesis H2, I will not elaborate too 
much on that here. I will however point to my impression that direct information sharing 
in Arkhangelsk seems to be stronger than in Murmansk. The information shared was 
mostly provided by Arkhangelsk Centre for Social Technologies Garant or it was based 
on personal contact with other activists. There did not seem to be any highly structured 
exchange of information between the organisations, such as a database of current projects. 
The Arkhangelsk ‘NGO leaders’ club’ that gathers once a month to exchange experiences 
is closest to an institutionalised form of CSO information sharing. In Murmansk some 
CSOs send newsletters to each other and keep web pages, and have contact with other 
CSO actors through personal relationships and through meetings arranged by the regional 
administration.  
Formal or informal network building between civil society actors is an extended form of 
information sharing. Initiative to network building seems to come from Garant in 
Arkhangelsk, from the oblast administration in Murmansk (that arranges monthly 
meetings for regional CSOs), and in some degree from the regional Barents Secretariat 
offices, which organise events where Russian CSOs meet to learn about Norwegian 
funding possibilities. In this context, network building is not a phenomenon mainly 
operated by the CSOs themselves. The monthly forums organised by the administration or 
the seminars by the Barents Secretariat are part of an outside framework and are thus not 
an expression of civil society organising itself.  
 
39 See chapter 2.4.1 for corresponding theory and operationalisations of the terms in this section.  
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Which actors are suited to unite civil society: authorities or CSOs themselves? On the one 
hand civil society is perceived as weak if it is not capable of developing by itself. On the 
other hand civil society has better conditions to blossom in a society positive to CSO 
activity. In Russia, it can be perceived as positive to the CSOs that they are officially 
supported by the administration, and yet it might also make CSOs seem dependent on the 
authorities when they actually want to represent an opposition movement. Both CSOs and 
authorities work to unite civil society, although far from all officials are as positive to 
CSOs as the Murmansk administration gives the impression of being. I will return to this 
subject in the discussion of the final hypothesis.  
Some CSOs express the wish for closer interaction with other groups, and have thoughts 
about the absence of a unity in the community. The leader of Arkhangelsk NGO Bridges 
of Mercy describes the relationship with other CSOs in Arkhangelsk like this: ‘We are 
pretty isolated. We have common seminars, but we are not united, our strengths are not 
united in one power’ (Danilova 2007 [interview]). Networks are with few exceptions only 
between organisations that share the same goals and issues, like indigenous peoples’ 
networks, youth organisations’ networks, ENGOs’ networks and disabled children NGOs 
with other interest groups for disabled. The indigenous peoples’ and the 
environmentalists’ issues have a tendency to overlap as both groups try to protect the 
same land.  
Regarding the oil pipeline from the Western Sibiria to Murmansk, we wanted to state that we 
disagreed, but it is dangerous to stand up alone against the big oil companies. We are not 
crazy! That’s why we formed the Northern Coalition.40 We also work with another, 
international coalition of environmental organisations that used to exist in different Soviet 
states. It’s the Social Ecological Union, the one created by Lenin. (…) We also collaborate 
with the Hope centre for homeless children in Apatity and with the indigenous peoples’ 
 
40 Established in 2003, the Northern Coalition consists of the ENGOs World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Bellona Murmansk, Gaia, 
The Kola Biodiversity Conservation Centre (in Apatity) and Priroda i Molodesh (PiM).  
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organisations on issues that concern them too because of the areas where they live. 
(Kruglikova 2007 [interview]) 
Networking seems important to the Norwegian partners. For example, NU emphasise the 
ENGO network in North-West Russia in their projects, and the Norwegian Association 
for Persons with Developmental Disabilities of Nordland (NFU) has recently received a 
MFA grant for a larger networking project between Russian CSOs for disabled. The 
Norwegian partners and funders associate a connected civil society with a strong civil 
society, in that it is easier to be heard if the choir is large and unanimous. Still, strong 
civil society networks seem absent both in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. What might be 
the reason for this? I found discrepancies between statements of how well developed the 
networks really are within the same city, depending on the type of organisation 
interviewed. The interview data indicate that the ENGOs have the best network amongst 
themselves, and that many of the other CSOs have such scattered interests that they do 
not invest the time and effort needed for a network to function. Another possible 
explanation could be one of self-preservation, i.e. the organisations compete against each 
other for the funding that is offered through grant competitions and partners. This 
assumption is discussed in section 5.2.  
Trust traced amongst the activists in different organisations comes from personal 
relationships. Personal connections seem to be highly important to several aspects of civil 
society work, as will be shown in the discussion of H3. Trust is also essential for 
networking, as is illustrated in this quote by Arkhangelsk CSO Rassvet’s representative.  
[The relationship to other NGOs in the area is] good. We cooperate on common events. 
Garant makes evaluations of us. We have seminars. We invite each other to participate in 
NGO meetings, for instance. We call each other. We share opinions. We cooperate with the 
NGOs that we trust and the rest we just don’t have any contact with. (Popkova 2007 
[interview]) 
Civic engagement between the CSOs and the population is another important ingredient 
in the long-term aspect of civil society development. It seems that public information 
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circulation is of much greater importance to the organisations than information shared 
with other CSOs. The CSOs make brochures, organise gatherings, appear on the radio and 
TV, have actions, courses, lectures and legal consultations, do surveys to understand 
public opinion, make and distribute newspapers, and arrange festivals and summer camps. 
Such community activity is part of all the organisations’ work, especially in the form of 
different types of seminars with education purposes for a target group in the local 
community. Community courses and seminars are also seen as means to educate people 
so that they know about their rights and how to use and defend them.  
The projects often have a local agenda – where people in the community teach each other 
to further develop the community. This is not to say that project ideas always come solely 
from local initiative. The idea of voluntary centres, for example, came from the 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). The Norwegian Consul General underlines that although 
based on a Norwegian idea the voluntary centres in Murmansk could never be like they 
are in Norway, since they have been developed with a Russian understanding (Aasheim 
2007 [interview]). The different cultural and societal grounds on which voluntary 
establishments stand in Russia and in Norway are emphasised by several Norwegian 
actors.  
The CSOs’ influence on authorities’ decision making is also an important component in 
the long-term development of an active and influential civil society. Most of the Russian 
CSO actors do not think that they have actual influence on political decision making. 
They feel that it is hard to get the authorities to see things their way. Nevertheless, they 
aim for influence through hearings, working groups and more direct contact with 
authorities, and there are some success stories on both local and federal levels.   
Three federal laws related to indigenous peoples’ rights were implemented in 1999, 2000 and 
2001. So we have influence. But laws here don’t work in reality. There has not been a 
practical mechanism implemented to realise the laws. We are pushing for that now. (Dordina 
2007 [interview]) 
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The discrepancy between decisions made and results reached came up in several 
interviews.  
We try to influence decision making, but sometimes the problems are not solved just because 
the decisions are made. Take the meeting that PiM had with the governor e.g. – the one where 
the leader of PiM met the governor on a plane and invited to a round table meeting. They 
reached an agreement that by 2020 there will be 20% wind energy in the total energy 
production. Working groups have been made. But is this realistic? (Kruglikova 2007 
[interview]) 
Bellona Murmansk’s representative shows an even deeper lack of expectation from the 
same event between the youth ENGO Priroda i Molodezh (PiM) and the governor of 
Murmansk, as she states that ‘I think it was a good PR stunt from the governor to meet 
with PiM. I do not see it as a development in any direction’ (Kireeva 2007 [interview]). 
Getting the authorities’ attention is according to this view not the same as influencing 
them. This division will be made more evident in the third section of this chapter.  
A final long-term dimension I use is the dedication to a CSO’s issues through voluntary 
work. Volunteers are an extensive part of all the CSOs that I interviewed, with exception 
from Bellona, Raipon and the New Eurasia Foundation (FNE). It varies, however, how 
many volunteers and employees there are and it is usual to get salary on a project basis, 
i.e. the responsible person for the project gets compensation for the work she puts in this 
particular project. The division between the volunteers and paid staff is rather hazy due to 
this, and so is the division between long- and short-term aspects of being dedicated to an 
issue and making a living from it. There does not have to be a strict division between the 
two, although in accordance with my operationalisations, salaries financed by project 
represent short-term gains. 
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5.1.3 Short-term benefits 
Financial compensations in form of project specific salaries may well come from 
funding. In addition, the youth ENGOs PiM and Aetas receive means from NU to employ 
a secretary and use an external bookkeeper. Other than this the funding does not support 
salaries explicitly. Nevertheless, in cases where foreign funding is the only income that 
the organisation has, it is also used to pay the employees’ salary. 
Administrative tasks (paper work, such as registrations, reports, databases, and personnel 
administration) would typically be handled by one particular person in charge of such 
work or again be part of a person’s project-related responsibility. Most CSO-
representatives underline the importance of administrative work in general, and report 
work in particular. The questionnaire asks how many hours a month they normally spend 
on administrative tasks, and the answers vary between three days and an entire month, the 
average time being about one week. Most funders are not too eager to give support to 
administrative tasks,41 even though the need for such work is obvious. It seems that the 
Norwegian CSOs expect their Russian partners to find alternative ways of paying for this. 
Some partners had withdrawn earlier funding to administration; e.g. Bellona used to get 
funding for administrative tasks and office expenses, but they now no longer do. The 
underlying idea seems to be that this is a step in the direction of stronger, more 
independent Russian CSOs.  
The largest portion of time spent on administration is devoured by report writing. The 
most extensive reports go to the Russian Federal Registration Service (Rosregistratsia) 
that demands thorough reports from all registered Russian NGOs in accordance with the 
NGO law of 2006. Consequences of the new law include longer and more sweeping 
reports from the NGOs every year. One CSO actually presents itself as a project under 
another association to avoid all the extra paperwork and tax rules that registering as an 
 
41 NU and the Sami Mission are the exceptions. 
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NGO would imply. Report writing especially takes time in larger organisations with many 
projects, and the amount of paperwork directed at Russian government can be so large it 
affects the organisations’ effectiveness on target areas. Time is an important factor, and if 
it is consumed by bureaucratic procedures it cannot be spent on networking or other 
activities that would support civil society on a long-term basis.  
Reports also go to Norwegian partners, mostly annually, and finally there are reports that 
are written for the Barents Secretariat or for the MFA from both Russian and Norwegian 
organisations. Time spent on reporting back to the Norwegians is between two and 528 
hours a month; in other words there are great differences depending on the size of the 
organisation and the number of funded projects. There is clearly a difference between 
fruitful reporting and excessive reporting. The overall impression I got from the Russian 
CSOs was one of resigned frustration over the work load that came with the new Russian 
demands for reports and documentation according to the new NGO law. Reports to 
partner CSOs and Norwegian funders (in English or Norwegian) were much less 
demanding, despite the fact that report writing in a foreign language is usually more time 
consuming. 
All organisations but two had received funding for technical equipment, and the majority 
had applied directly for this kind of support. Mostly such support was requested and 
given in the very beginning of a partnership when many Russian CSOs needed assistance 
to start up an office and activities.  
Internal seminars or meetings are a common feature in all the Russian CSOs except for 
Bellona. These could be annual or more frequent meetings, training of volunteers, 
strategy seminars with themes like funding and effective use of resources, etc. Common 
for these internal activities is that they do not reach out to the wider public or to other 
CSOs and thus have no long-term perspective of development. Nevertheless, internal 
meetings are often part of the project scheme and thus funded. Annual meetings are not so 
popular with the Barents Secretariat, and therefore they tend to be given different labels in 
the applications, such as “seminar” or “conference”. I wonder why it is necessary to 
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disguise annual meetings like this if everybody involved, including the funders, knows 
what a “seminar” that appears once a year means. This could be the product of an 
underlying goal orientation in the funding. Annual meetings rarely lead to anything 
concrete. Wrapping them up in funder-friendly paper is a way around an unwelcome 
criterion. 
5.1.4 Conclusion to H1  
This section has outlined how criteria and expectations of Norwegian funders and 
partners correspond with existing long- and short-term incentives of the North-West 
Russian CSOs. Especially CSO networking is emphasised and described as limited in 
Russian civil society, yet important for Norwegian partners. Short-term benefits are 
furthermore described as relevant and frequent. As I expected, I found that Russian CSOs 
were encouraged by Norwegian criteria to pursue projects with short-term benefits. 
Additionally I found that the CSOs’ aimed for the contrary: long-term civic development.  
Norwegian assistance to CSOs operating in North-West Russia does indeed seem to 
encourage the CSOs to pursue short-term benefits, but not necessarily over or instead of 
long-term development. By this I mean that the driving force of the CSOs work and 
existence collectively appears to be a long-term incentive to change parts of society. 
Whether environmental protection, women’s or indigenous peoples’ rights, freedom of 
press, youth awareness, or more social work related issues; the ideas on which such 
projects and funding are based have long-term goals. The way towards these goals can be 
an impractical one if basic short-term needs are not covered. In this way the short-term 
incentives can go hand-in-hand with more long-term development. Reports, for example, 
are ultimately feedback that is supposed to benefit future projects, and internal seminars 
can just as well be beneficial in the long run, if the participants learn to become more 
effective and including in their activities. 
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The hypothesis must be considered in a certain timeframe. Within the short-term 
timeframe of a standard project (with funding for one year at the time), the funder clearly 
emphasises criteria encouraging short-term, countable results. H1 does on the other hand 
not seem to be relevant in a larger timeframe of an entire partnership. In a partnership 
perspective over several years, the progress of civil society through long-term goals is 
superior to short-term project goals. Is it then correct to confirm or to reject H1? 
Norwegian funding criteria to CSOs operating in North-West Russia does clearly 
encourage both the Norwegian CSOs and their Russian partners to pursue short-term 
benefits over long-term development within the project timeframe. Since “Norwegian 
assistance” is operationalised as funding through the Project Cooperation with Russia, H1 
must be interpreted in the short-term view of project funding. Although the short-term 
benefits do not have to contradict the long-term goals, it is correct to confirm H1 in the 
given project view: Norwegian assistance to CSOs operating in North-West Russia indeed 
encourages the CSOs to pursue short-term benefits over long-term development. 
5.2 Partnerships – all about money?  
The second assumption that theory on foreign funding gave me was that organisations 
with the longest history of Norwegian-oriented agendas would receive the trust of the 
Norwegian funders and partners, thus creating a competition between the CSOs to adjust 
to Norwegian models of civil society activity. The initial conceptualisation of the key 
expression “Norwegian models of civil society activity” was set in chapter 2.4.2. In this 
section I will reveal the more comprehensive understanding based on characteristics 
provided by Norwegian civil society actors. Overall I found rather contradictory evidence 
to what partnerships with Norwegian CSOs mean for Russian agendas, attitudes, 
competition and adjustment to external ideas of civil society activity.  
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5.2.1 Models of civil society activity 
What are Norwegian models of civil society activity? I tried to grasp this by asking about 
CSO activity and local civil society norms. The answers drew a picture of a Norwegian 
emphasis on democratic organisations and growing focus on project work, but also of the 
importance of individual forces and of collaboration between organisations on subject 
matters. Voluntary involvement was also mentioned as a feature of the common 
Norwegian civil society. How do Russian organisations adapt to such ideals, and to what 
degree? The data presented in chapter 5.1 has shown that Norwegian organisations 
appreciate sharing basic values with their partners. Although there is an appreciation of 
differences in societies and cultures, there is also a strong motivation for societal change 
towards a liberal understanding of democracy. This seems to be a paradox within 
Norwegian funding policy. Some organisations recognise the need to adapt to the 
expectations of their funders. 
To find a suitable fund and write an application in the way that they want it [is important 
when elaborating a project proposal to a foreign organisation]. Then you will have success. 
The applicants should adapt their projects to the fund’s requirements. (Kireeva 2007 
[interview]) 
What does it mean that there are such adaptations? Are they an expression of alteration of 
own ideals in order to achieve monetary support? Or is it like the “undercover annual 
meetings” just a way of wrapping things up to make them presentable? An adoption of the 
funder’s ideals would imply that the Russian organisation is nothing but a mere 
Norwegian puppet on the civil society scene. The authorities in Murmansk have indeed 
accused Bellona Murmansk of this. In Arkhangelsk the members of Aetas, another 
ENGO, were accused of being spies for the Norwegians. In other words, this is a 
perception cultivated by Russian authorities about organisations that are known for their 
critical voice against government decisions about nuclear energy and protection of natural 
resources – issues of economic importance. Adaptations in accordance with a fund’s 
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requirements do not have to alter the underlying ideals. Based on the projects run by the 
different organisations, I doubt that they do. Often the ideals of the partners are very 
similar, and are even the very foundation of the partnership.  
I traced a difference between Russian and Norwegian understandings on some key 
subjects. Many organisations even mentioned “differences in mentality” as a main 
challenge in the collaboration. The Northern Feminist University (KUN) had this 
experience from working with Russian women’s rights organisations.  
What you could talk about in relation to sexuality and violence [was challenging]. The 
feminist movement in Russia had a few introductions with a very clear message. But in 
discussions it was a challenge to know how far you could go. They had a different view on the 
use of sexuality in relation to women’s career opportunities, for instance. Not to let oneself be 
provoked and respect their view was a challenge. (Stemland 2007 [phone interview]) 
A Norwegian CSO representative operating in the Murmansk region sets out this 
metaphor on differences and similarities in culture and mentality.  
[Russian mentality is] like a key card, with those holes, that is put over a Norwegian key card. 
Some of the holes will overlap. In this way there will be a common understanding on some 
points, but not a common pattern or understanding that is equal for the entire card – nor for 
the entire way of thinking, neither on gender equality nor freedom of press. (Giskegjerde 2007 
[interview]) 
Which holes overlap? Some indications were given by the interviewees. The leader of the 
women’s network CWKP in Murmansk told me that ‘women from the Norwegian Labour 
Party became a great example, a light for us in 1994-98. It was a hard period and we 
needed good examples’ (Parshkova 2007 [interview]). Seeing Norwegian ways as a 
source of role models clearly reflects a Norwegian-oriented attitude. 
Norwegian civil society ideas are also transferred because the Norwegian organisations 
are seen as more experienced, and more plausible to succeed because of prior success in 
Western countries. Several Russian NGOs have adopted a model of democratic 
  75  
 
organisation from Norwegian partners, and Russian law requires a member base for an 
organisation to register as an NGO. Does this implicate that a democratic organisation is 
actually considered necessary by the Russians? The following quotations illustrating 
attitudes of organisation are extracted from two interviews of the partner ENGOs Gaia 
and NNF. 
If you are registered as an NGO in Russia you have to be member-based – at least 3 members 
are required. We have about 50, but only ca. 11 pay the annual fee that we just started to 
collect (300 roubles). About another 50 collaborate on projects, but they do not want to 
become members. It is not a priority for us to have them as members either, as long as they 
are involved. (Kruglikova 2007 [interview]) 
It has been a challenge that they [Gaia] are developing a member-based organisation. They 
think it is not important. We want them to see that bigger structures give more power to 
influence. Democratic organisation is important. Broad popular participation is created this 
way. (Lorentzen 2007 [interview]) 
5.2.2 Understanding of civil society and democracy 
I asked all of the interviewees about their understanding of civil society and democratic 
rights. A third of the Norwegian interviewees connected democratic structure of the 
organisation directly with civil society, and more than half linked civil society with 
various democratic rights. The Russian answers were similar in some ways, especially on 
the connection between civil society and democratic rights. However, many Russian 
interviewees began to speak of problems of a weak civil society: people’s passivity in 
society due to authoritarian mentality passed on from the Soviet system; lack of popular 
support for CSOs; and the gap between what people want to do, what they actually do and 
what the government will let them do.  
Sami civil society reflects all of what is happening in the big Russian civil society: People do 
not feel responsible and they are not active, only in parts. Some look to authorities and think 
of what the authorities might do, before they act. (…) [Democratic rights] depend on the level 
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of civil society – on how grown up it is. Generally, we are like a newborn; the civil society is 
newborn. We know about democratic rights but they are something new. It is like this: we 
tried to get it, we got it, but we don’t know what to do with it. (Prakhova 2007 [interview]) 
Generational differences are above all traceable in the way the interviewees talk about 
civil society. Older generations that lived in the USSR are more negative towards rapid 
societal change and they share less of the Norwegian perspectives on democratic rights 
and civil society. Younger generations of civil society activists that grew up during the 
1980s and 1990s see themselves as the new hope for a change of mentality. These two 
quotes illustrate a cleavage with positive potential for future development of civil society 
in Russia: 
[Democratic rights] is even worse to define than civil society! If I had been younger then 
maybe I could have said something based on young hope. (Sedovina 2007 [interview]) 
The newspaper [that we make] is good for the youth, because it will take a generation change 
to change this situation. Youth in Russia now is quite different – the way they think and act. 
They are not part of the collective, they are individuals. They have bigger success and can 
travel and discover opportunities. Soviet people are suspicious, they do not believe in 
freedom. (Vetsko 2007 [interview]) 
I asked the Russian civil society actors what they thought of foreign funding, and the 
answers gave the impression that foreign funding is still necessary for the CSOs’ survival, 
and that this is unfortunate because the Russian state should be more inclusive to civil 
society. Naturally most interviewees are positive to the funding they themselves are 
receivers of. They see that funding can give economic strength to action and influence, 
but some also underline downsides, i.e. that funding can attract actors not interested in the 
issues as much as in the money. Furthermore, positively perceived developments of CSOs 
in society, like more independence from authorities and more influence on political 
decision making, are repeatedly linked with the opportunities opened by foreign funding.  
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According to the oldest CSOs, foreign funding seems to be decreasing in the north-
western regions. This can simply imply that there is now less money for the CSOs than 
before. Conversely it can indicate that the Russian CSOs are getting more Russian 
funding and thus are becoming more independent from foreign support. The federal 
Russian forums for civil society funding and networking drew a mixed response on the 
subject of Russian support. The Civic Chamber is mostly seen as an artificial construction 
that has no real power, but that it is better to have this than not to have anything. A 
continuous need for both foreign and Russian backing of general system changes in 
addition to mere projects is clearly expressed.  
I also asked for the Norwegians’ understandings of Russian civil society. The answers 
varied greatly, but there were several comments on differences from Norwegian civil 
society, i.e. that Russians had more respect for authorities and experts, and less economic 
resources. Norwegian opinions on democratic development on Russian federal level can 
be summed up as cautiously negative, especially to the increasing centralisation and 
control of the Kremlin. The understanding of such developments on the level of North-
West Russian regional government is however more optimistic.  
Long-term development results are reached more slowly than some Norwegian partners 
hoped for in the beginning. There is a time for everything, I have been told over and over 
again. It does not seem that the time for democratic optimism would be now. Norwegian 
actors’ understanding of their own role in this development is nevertheless quite 
confident. I often asked if they believed that they were part of creating democratic 
awareness. Most Norwegian CSOs indeed believe this, and they often assumed that I was 
asking about their work exclusively in Russian society. Moreover I asked if changes in 
Russian society had affected the project collaborations. Some did not think so, while 
others mentioned negative effects of new laws and political centralisation of power. One 
Norwegian actor flipped it around and told me that ‘changes were usually initiated by us, 
not the other way around’. 
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5.2.3 Weight of history  
Cross-border history seems to be repeating itself with the ongoing collaborations. Either 
the partners met years ago or they met based on prior engagements between other 
Norwegian or Russian organisations. Relationships directly passed-on occurred only with 
the FNE, that had ‘inherited the cooperation from the American Eurasia Foundation in 
1999’ (Moshkova 2007 [interview]). Some of the collaborations were characterised as 
coincidences that sprung out of prior engagements. Most Norwegian CSOs that today 
collaborate with Russian organisations have been involved with Russian civil society 
work since the first years after the break-up of the Soviet Union.  
The history of Russian CSOs’ financial collaboration with foreigners was measured in the 
questionnaire. Ten out of a total of thirteen organisations had been receiving Norwegian 
funding since they started to receive foreign funding.42 Seven out of these ten 
organisations received the funding since they were founded or even before. The 
organisations that now receive funding have been doing so for a minimum of six years.43 
This funding history indicates how the relationship between Norwegian and North-West 
Russian CSOs has been fairly constant during post-Soviet times, and makes out a 
common history of cooperation.  
The long history in itself is an interesting feature; what does it indicate that there have 
been no recent additions to the partnerships? On the one hand, it can be a sign of an 
integrated and stable CSO community that has settled considerably after the volatile NGO 
landscape in the 1990s. In this scenario there are no new relationships because there are 
no new actors that wish to establish them. Observations on NGO development in 
 
42 Various countries and programmes were funding the CSOs I interviewed in North-West Russia. Some examples are: the EU’s 
programme of technical assistance to CIS countries (TACIS), the Swedish international development cooperation agency Sida, 
the Danish and the Finnish Foreign Ministries, and the American Ford Foundation and Eurasia Foundation.  
43 The American Eurasia Foundation operated in Russia from 1993. The foundation had to register as a Russian NGO in 2004 due 
to the new NGO regulations, and the New Eurasia Foundation (FNE) overtook the cooperation with the Barents Secretariat and 
MFA. This extension of the collaboration has thus naturally a shorter history than six years.  
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Arkhangelsk indicate that the NGO flora has decreased since the year 2000 (Danilova 
2007 [interview]). This certainly gives some backing for the suppositional explanation as 
to why there were no known new Russian-Norwegian partnerships working with projects 
of civil society and democratic development. On the other hand the established 
partnerships can form a closed door for new actors that wish to develop cross-border 
projects. So can the requirements of an established partnership in advance for obtaining 
Norwegian grants, because it encourages continuing with the same partners.  
I asked how the relationship had developed over time, and got answers that indicate a 
development from funder-receiver relationships to partnerships and more independence 
for the Russian organisations. This eco-activist sees his ENGO’s growing independence 
from the Norwegian partner NU as an indispensable consequence of living and operating 
in two so different societies:  
[Different mentalities] influence everything. We are both environmental organisations, but we 
are in different situations. They don’t understand everything that is going on in Russia. 
Norway is an ideal for us – but it might not be so [for you]? In the beginning it was more of a 
mother and child relationship (money, advice). But the child is different from the parent. The 
surroundings are so different. It’s social [differences]! (Nesterov 2007 [interview]) 
5.2.4 Trust and competition 
Trust and funding are intertwined in a pretty obvious way – the organisations receiving 
funding are also trusted. Nobody would support someone they didn’t believe would spend 
that money fairly and wisely. The Norwegians seem to believe that the funding is 
necessary for developing the aspects of Russian society that they are interested in. Since 
there is limited funding and several CSOs dependant on it, it is reasonable to assume that 
there would be a certain competition about the grants. After all, the very words “grant 
competition” are used to describe the foundations’ way of choosing projects to support. 
Nevertheless, I found no openness about this aspect of the CSOs’ relationship to one 
another neither in Murmansk nor in Arkhangelsk.  
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As shown in chapter 5.1, civil society activist networks are not well developed. Little 
cooperation does not automatically mean much competition, but the question does come 
to mind. Is there competition or rivalry over the same funding? The Russian organisations 
did not tell me about difficulties amongst them, but rather gave me the innocent version. I 
can only assume that this reticence had something to do with my origin as a Norwegian 
student who collaborated with the Barents Institute. Is there just harmony between 
Russian CSOs seeking partners’ support? Quite the opposite version was given by two 
Norwegian actors who underline the difficulties that a competition between the Russian 
CSOs implied.  
The NGOs compete with each other over project funding. There is no particular network 
between them. They are on the border of existence and they need all means from outside to 
survive. (Karlsen 2007 [interview]) 
Also [our projects are having a bit of a hard time with] the enormous competition within [the 
Russian community] to find western partners and build [an organisation]. It has not always 
been so professionally oriented. We noticed that, and sometimes it has limited the project 
development since we didn’t get in touch with the people that we could have obtained contact 
with. After a while I’ve found out that territorial thinking is quite extensive in Norwegian 
environments as well – to make a living. (Ingebrigtsen 2007 [interview]) 
5.2.5 Conclusion to H2 
This section has shown that all the Russian organisations have a longer history with 
Norwegians than six years, and they seem to develop attitudes more in correspondence 
with their partners’ as time goes by. Trust is a tricky term to measure, but in this case it 
has been straightforward to connect trust with repeated funding and prolonged 
collaboration; the established partners are continuing relationships with people and 
organisations that they trust from experience. Partnerships are established firmly over 
time. This seems to be a point that the MFA and the Barents Secretariat has taken into 
account and implemented as a criterion for funding. At the same time it indicates that new 
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partnerships are not encouraged. The Russian-Norwegian history of CSO cooperation 
also shows a development from funder-receiver relationships to partnerships and more 
Russian independence from the Norwegian supporter.  
Time of cooperation is furthermore a factor when Norwegian attitudes are transferred to 
Russian reality. Several organisations have adapted the organisational structure of a 
Norwegian democratic ideal. Some of the Russian CSOs, like Bellona Murmansk and 
PiM, were in fact created by Norwegian CSOs. It is not surprising that their ideals then 
overlap. But other Russian CSOs were already established before meeting Norwegian 
partners, and these must truly adapt to another way of thinking. In case they do adapt to 
an ideal Norwegian organisational structure, it may be for several reasons. One is of 
course because the restructuring actually improves the organisational structure. Another 
reason is that it improves the relationship to the partner. It is not possible to distinguish 
any clear tendencies here based on my data. Nevertheless, it is a question of importance 
on what ground Norwegian influence on North-West Russian civil society actors is 
received. If the democratic organisation is a forced structure, it is not likely to stay with 
the Russians after the Norwegians pull out of the cooperation.  
The evidence of this chapter has shown that CSOs with the longest history of Norwegian-
oriented outlook do indeed receive the trust of the Norwegian funders and partners. I have 
focused on certain Norwegian-oriented attitudes when it comes to democratic 
understandings of organisational structure, equality of the sexes, openness in society, and 
environment protection. “Differences of mentality” especially becomes obvious when 
comparing attitudes of the way societal structures should be, but not so much when 
comparing the very understanding of a civil society or of democratic rights. It is worth 
repeating that many organisations mention differences in mentality as a challenge in the 
collaboration.  
Does this first part of H2 actually ‘create a competition between CSOs to adjust to 
Norwegian models of civil society activity’? I have no reason to believe so, because there 
is no evidence that can support such a causal relationship. Both the first and the second 
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part of H2 are supported by data, although Russian and Norwegian data do not overlap 
when it comes to statements of competition among the Russian civil society actors. The 
fact that the second part of H2 is met with this discrepancy may imply a methodological 
problem as well, as mentioned in 4.3. There is not enough evidence to confirm H2’s 
second part, nor is there any evidence for the causality proposed by the hypothesis. For 
these two reasons I reject H2: although CSOs with the longest history of Norwegian-
oriented agendas do receive the trust of the Norwegian funders and partners, there is not 
an obvious competition between the CSOs to adjust to Norwegian models of civil society 
activity, nor is there evidence for the causal connection proposed in H2.  
5.3 Government and civil society 
My last theoretical assumption is that in North-West Russia the level of cooperation 
between authorities and CSOs is high, and this has a positive influence on the CSOs 
realisation of Norwegian-oriented agendas. In order to evaluate the value of such a 
hypothesis I need to consider some of the factors discussed in the previous sections of this 
analysis. Norwegian-oriented agendas can be reflected in goals shared with Norwegian 
partners, and these vary greatly, from building a democratic organisation to developing 
consciousness about legal rights and actually using these rights to improve living 
conditions. How does the cooperation with authorities affect the agenda realisation – 
when some CSOs feel that they are in opposition to authorities, while others feel that they 
work closely with the system for the common good of society as a whole? A few 
tendencies can be sketched from the answers given.  
5.3.1 Different authorities, different cooperation  
One important difference between the federal, the regional and the city authorities is 
pointed out by the Norwegian Consul General: the regional authorities are not dependent 
on permissions from Moscow, so it is easier to cooperate with them than with the city 
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authorities or the federal authorities and their regional representatives (Aasheim 2007 
[interview]). A general regional independence from the federal authorities still seems to 
be applicable despite the reforms made to decrease the governors’ powers. In contrast, 
Russian youth organisations seem to have a better relationship with the local than with the 
regional authorities.  
There are no protected areas here, and when we address [this] and suggest such a thing as 
forest protection, the regional authorities accuse us of being spies for the Norwegians – it’s 
true! With the city authorities we have a better relationship, they try to support us. We have a 
youth Soviet here with many youth politicians, but very few NGO representatives. We try to 
be a part of it, but as of now we have not succeeded. (…) We have meetings with the major, 
but he does not always understand the questions we ask him. Nevertheless, he is the first 
major who has tried to meet with young people here. (Kolodii 2007 [interview]) 
Federal government is often referred to as remote, yet in the end responsible. In the office 
of a CSO there was a poster from Journalists without Frontiers. “Predators of the Press” is 
the headline. Putin is shown next to a picture of Charles Taylor in Liberia and 
Lukashenko in Belarus. This kind of direct critique is however atypical, even of federal 
authorities. On regional and local level, CSOs generally have a dialogue with the 
authorities, where they join forces or openly disagree with each other depending on the 
issues. 
5.3.2 High and low level of cooperation  
The Russian CSOs mainly see a positive development in the relationship to regional and 
local authorities within social aid and education projects as well as environment 
protection projects. Constructive meetings with the major of Arkhangelsk and the 
governor of Murmansk are examples of new experiences for green activists. Also 
Norwegian CSOs give the impression of a positive development. The Norwegian Helsinki 
Committee organises “human rights schools” within an educational framework in 
Murmansk. Murmansk regional public relations office has been a great help to them as a 
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gatekeeper to obtain official support. Although they had to wait a year for the governor’s 
blessing, the practicalities of the courses were a success thanks to assistance from the 
regional administration. A good collaboration with the regional government opens 
opportunities that the CSOs alone cannot provide.  
After a while we have experienced that collaboration with the authorities in Murmansk is not 
controversial. Then it is not hard for us [to collaborate]. Actually we have experienced that 
they do what they promise and are responsible. (…) The authorities have more influence than 
the NGOs. Parshkova [leader of the regional public relations office] gets us 14 people that 
will talk about human rights, of which six are in uniform. This we could never have gotten 
through an NGO. (Djuliman 2007 [interview]) 
On the other hand, impressions were sometimes rather negative. Although channels of 
interaction were open and functioning, the flow of communication was often seen as a 
one-way stream.  
I do think, quite personally, that it was difficult to get them [the officials] to listen. They were 
occupied with presenting their case. It was opulently presented, they gave a nicer image than 
the one you had in your head. They were concerned with presenting the sunny side, not with 
listening and finding the way ahead. (Hutchinson 2007 [interview]) 
The feeling of being listened to but not heard was expressed on several occasions by the 
Russian CSOs too. Counter-arguments from authorities have been that specific societal 
problems do not exist in their region. CSOs that have heard such statements are working 
with problems like nuclear power development, violence against women, and child 
prostitution. Rejecting an actual societal problem by labelling it “non-existent” is an easy 
way around it. Persistent CSOs have a lot to do with seeking even basic 
acknowledgement of regional societal problems. This can be seen as part of the 
previously mentioned new openness in Russian society. 
Differences as well as similarities between the regions and the towns can be traced. Both 
Murmansk and Arkhangelsk seem to have mechanisms for interaction with advocates of 
civil society activity, although somewhat varying in form. As mentioned, the regional 
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public relations office organises monthly forums for the CSOs in Murmansk, where they 
are to discuss problems with other CSOs and with invited representatives of the regional 
government (Pashkova 2007 [interview]). There is also a fund for regional organisations 
in the Murmansk regional budget. The overall impression I got from the CSOs in the two 
regions was that the Murmansk regional administration had a more elaborated interaction 
with CSOs. The fact that Murmansk also has the largest military presence and a strong 
tradition of government control of every aspect of society might be a separate factor 
affecting the same outcome. Could the high level of government involvement here also 
reflect traditions of state control in a new function? It is worth having in mind when 
comparing regions that the regional history influences contemporary regional 
development just as the nationwide history influences the general civil society 
development described in chapter 2.  
In Arkhangelsk it is the CSO Garant that acts as the main intermediary between different 
CSOs, and between CSOs, the local authorities and the businesses. They also have a 
special city programme with the local budget which implies that the city budget 
contributes with 50 percent of the charitable fund for grants that is administered by 
Garant.44 The fact that I did not speak with an Arkhangelsk government representative 
has likely affected the impression I have of less collaborative activity between CSOs and 
the regional government there. However, I discussed CSO-authority cooperation 
extensively with the CSOs (especially Garant) and asked the local Barents Secretariat 
office about mechanisms of cooperation. By doing this I hope to avoid inconsistency.  
The larger organisations in Moscow point out some regional differences that they have 
noticed. Indigenous peoples’ NGO Raipon has observed that  
 
44 There is an agreement with the local government that the budget is to provide an amount of some 2 million roubles and Garant 
is to raise the equal amount from private sponsors. Foreign funding to Garant is to maintain the organisation with salaries, 
equipment, and cover activities and administrative expenses.  
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In some regions there is a good cooperation with the government and in others they always 
say that they have no authority to support us. It all depends on how strong the indigenous 
peoples’ movement is in the region and how good the will of the government is. In North-
West Russia it is hard, and in Nenets the indigenous peoples groups have very little contact 
with the government. In Murmansk it is also hard. (Dordina 2007 [interview]) 
5.3.3 Influential collaboration 
Are goals hard to reach when the CSOs do not collaborate with authorities on a high 
level? It depends of course on how much the CSOs directly try to influence the authorities 
and how dependent their issues are of a governmental blessing. Naturally, CSOs that 
experience difficulties in interaction with authorities also have problems reaching their 
goals of influencing political decisions. ENGOs are often in opposition to official 
standpoints, so collaborating with authorities can be a challenge. Bellona Murmansk 
exemplifies this tendency.  
[Our goal is] public participation in environmental questions. The Russian situation is that the 
government is concealing some issues. This goes for any public issue. The government talks 
about project developments but then they should come to public hearings and listen and be 
asked uncomfortable questions. And the public should hear this. The contact with the 
government is difficult – they don’t want to let us be involved. (Kireeva 2007 [interview]) 
Bellona also has a hard time obtaining local funding ‘mostly because we have the 
reputation of being Norwegian-oriented’ (Lesikhina 2007 [interview]). The same goes for 
the previously mentioned case with the youth activists of Aetas who were accused of 
being spies for the Norwegians. Norwegian-oriented agendas do not necessarily inspire a 
positive reaction from the authorities. These cases are noticeably ENGOs that have many 
goals of changing environmental politics in their regions. Other organisations that have an 
economical-political undertone in their issues, such as environment protection, indigenous 
peoples’ rights, and foreign influenced organisations that aim to change Russian society, 
also told me about very low level of cooperation and governmental non-collaboration and 
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even hostility towards them. The pro-American foundation FNE stands as an example of 
the latter.  
Before we were perceived as an organisation with negative attitudes towards the Russian 
government. We were partly blamed for the orange revolution in Ukraine. This was black PR 
that appeared in the regional and federal press. So as a result we didn’t have a chance to 
develop many projects at that time – because we want them to be implemented in society. The 
political situation was given as the reason for non-collaboration with us in many ministries. 
(Moshkova 2007 [interview]) 
Projects with a social aid aspect are on the other hand the ones most prone to cooperate 
well with and receive support from various levels of Russian government. Attitudes 
towards CSOs with Norwegian-oriented agendas thus seem to be related to the CSO’s 
activity and issues. In the social aid projects, official institutions could even take over 
responsibilities from CSOs, continuing the realisation of project goals as part of public 
service. This was the case with a project between the NPA and Bridges of Mercy.  
We did the same [start activity centres for the elderly] in the village, we sent volunteers there. 
After a year we became friends with the government and they sent an employee there. In this 
way an idea lives on. (…) We have regular collaboration [with the government]. But there is 
one thing I don’t like: I go to them, but they rarely come to me. That means that they don’t 
see us as a force. We mustn’t think that they are our hope. We must think that we can be 
useful to society. Norwegian money was spent to renovate the centre for the elderly, which is 
a communal building! (Danilova 2007 [interview]) 
According to the FNE, every region wants to show to some target program that it solves 
special regional problems. If the issues of the CSOs are within this regional scope, the 
CSOs have a greater chance of getting political goodwill for their causes (Moshkova 2007 
[interview]). Social aid issues seem to prevail over environmental issues on the agenda of 
regional priorities in both Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, although the youth 
environmentalists I interviewed in both regions are reporting a more collaborative spirit 
from the authorities now than ever before.  
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Does good cooperation with government imply a more influential civil society? The 
question was raised by Gaia’s representative who had an overall good relation to the local 
authorities in Apatity and the Murmansk authorities. She questions the democratic value 
of collaboration when it is only on the terms of the authorities.  
We call if we want to meet with somebody [in both the regional and local administration]. The 
governor has a tight schedule, so then we must call in advance. It is much more open and 
democratic here in Apatity than in Alta, we were told when we were in Alta with the NNF. 
But then the question is if this has got [something] to do with democracy; that you always 
have to ask the major for permission? (Kruglikova 2007 [interview]) 
When influencing decision making is an aim, there are several ways to go about it. This 
was explained in the first section of this chapter, and is worth repeating to enhance the 
importance of collaboration when the goal itself is to be heard by the decision makers. 
Personal relationships have a great influence on how the CSOs and the government 
collaborate. It has repeatedly been stated that personal contacts are the most important 
way to generate influence. Collaboration seems to work excellently as long as there are 
personal acquaintances with officials or bureaucrats that are willing to support the ideas 
represented to them. Rotation of officials was additionally mentioned as a factor 
influencing good or bad relationships, as the personal contact dissolves when somebody 
new enters a position. With some officials collaborating is easy, with others it is difficult. 
Prior civil society contacts that enter governmental institutions make communication 
easier for CSOs that try to get their issues acknowledged. In this way, it is a great benefit 
to civil society in Murmansk to have a leader of the public relations office with a long 
history in the CWKP network.  
The informal pathways of communication between Russian CSOs and authorities are so 
strong that they intertwine with the formal channels. Not all organisations are invited to 
hearings because they invite persons and not organisations, I was told. Hearings are a new 
kind of formal communication that does not seem to be working too well. A sentence that 
was frequently repeated was: ‘We find out about public hearings too late.’ CSOs seem to 
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be less interested in public hearings in Russia than in Norway, perhaps as a natural 
consequence of the limited effect of Russian hearings. Another explanation may be that 
formalised Russian hearings are a relatively new phenomenon, which might still be 
suffering under a lack of comprehension and acceptance by both CSO actors and the 
authorities. Working groups established by authorities seem to be more common as a 
forum for formal advice on issues from civil society actors to the decision makers.  
Lobbying is a term that not all Russian interviewees were familiar with. Some answered 
in the questionnaire that the organisation did not perform any kind of lobbying, before 
explaining how they attract the attention of representatives of legislative and executive 
bodies to their issues. ‘Invitations to meetings’ are more commonly used as a way of 
expressing such interaction. Russian CSOs consequently separate representatives of 
regional and local authorities from politicians, who are seen as less important and without 
actual power. Therefore, the CSOs rarely invite politicians to meetings. In a couple of 
cases this tendency had been picked up by the Norwegian partner, and a change in 
practice had been encouraged. At the end of the interview with the disabled children’s 
NGO Zabota, my attention was resolutely drawn to this influence.  
I hope that you have understood that thanks to them [NFU] we are learning to pay attention to 
the political underlining. It’s like a political ABC course between us and the authorities! 
(Sedovina 2007 [interview]) 
5.3.4 Conclusion to H3 
A high level of collaboration between civil society and local as well as regional 
authorities is demonstrated in most cases. Cases where collaboration with authorities is 
good also show successful projects, often as consequence of this collaboration. Garant, 
Rassvet, Briges of Mercy, PiM, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and North Norway’s 
Diaconal Foundation (NND) are all examples of this. There are also some deviant cases 
that have experienced recently low level of collaboration with Russian authorities because 
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of their agendas, such as Bellona and the FNE (that has been associated with the orange 
revolution in Ukraine). Whether or not the cooperation has a direct positive influence on 
realisation of Norwegian-oriented agendas is also not always clear, unless the agenda 
itself is to collaborate with government. 
The level of cooperation with authorities is furthermore not the only factor that affects 
realisation of goals. In most cases, internal problems in the organisations or between the 
partners in the project themselves prevent the best results, e.g. because of language and 
communication problems, the success or failure of further fundraising, practical obstacles 
such as the visa regime and general corruption, etc. All these variables interact on the 
success of a project, and based on my data, it is not possible to evaluate the effect of these 
variables separately from the effect of collaboration with authorities. Nevertheless, I 
consider H3 to be relevant for the majority of the cases studied in Murmansk and 
Arkhangelsk within the social aid related subjects. ENGOs, and CSOs with agendas in 
opposition to Russian government’s politics, such as the FNE, are the deviant cases that 
cause a partial rejection of H3.  
Finally, the inevitable complexity of how goals are reached, together with deviant cases 
and the uncertain effect of cooperation on Norwegian-oriented agendas, contribute to the 
rejection of H3: in North-West Russia a high level of cooperation between regional/local 
authorities and CSOs does not have a demonstrably positive influence on the realisation 
of Norwegian-oriented agendas.  
5.4 Chapter reflections     
H1 has been confirmed by data showing that Norwegian assistance to CSOs operating in 
North-West Russia does indeed encourage the CSOs to pursue short-term benefits over 
long-term development. This verification must, however, be seen in a project timeframe. 
The reason for incentives for short-term benefits is not the activists’ motivation for their 
work but rather the practical necessities of everyday life and activity. Income, equipment, 
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office space, internal seminars and demanded reports are necessary components for 
managing organisational activity. Most of the Norwegian partners seem to agree on this 
need and give funding for short-term goals to reach the true objectives with time. 
According to the theory presented in chapter 2.4.1, foreign aid contributes to creating 
‘vertical, institutionalized and isolated (although well-funded) civil community’ 
(Henderson 2002:140), where the preference of short-term benefits over long-term 
development ultimately hinders rather than facilitates civic development (ibid.:141). 
Henderson does not emphasise the partnership aspect of funding and thus long-term goals 
of strengthening the Russian organisation and its influence on local and regional political 
decision-making over time is not taken into account. My research adds the importance of 
partnerships that are stable over time as a positive contribution to encouraging civic 
development in North-West Russia.  
The prior research that generated H2 in 2.4.2 found that even though foreign donors 
invest heavily in communication networks among Russian CSOs, the communication is 
mostly simple information exchange and not concrete collaboration (Sundstrom 2006). 
This seems to be the general trend in my research too, even though there are more 
developed networks as well, especially between the ENGOs. Other theory presented in 
2.4.2 added the aspect of the “new elite of civic activists” (Henderson 2002:157) and the 
creation of new cleavages within an initially weak CSO community due to foreign 
funding (Schmidt 2005a:28). I could not find enough evidence to confirm these aspects in 
North-West Russia, although some CSO competition was reveiled by Norwegian 
partners. It was in one case confirmed that competitiveness made a group split up and a 
former group member established her own organisation and a separate partnership with 
another Norwegian CSO. It is, however, highly uncertain if grants were the trigger that 
provided an incentive for different factions of the organisation to split up.  
H2 had to be rejected due to scarce evidence, but interesting further questions came out of 
the initial assumption. Norwegian influence can make Russian CSOs alter organisational 
structure, but this is by far not the only motivation for restructuring the organisation. At 
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least three members are required to be a member based NGO in Russia, which again is a 
requirement to register as an NGO. Do three persons form a member base? Bellona 
Murmansk has six members, and is a member based NGO. In Norway the Bellona 
Foundation is just that – a foundation with no members. Who forces the Russian 
organisations to transform into structures that might seem misplaced? Demands and 
influences from Russian authorities are also important to consider when trying to 
understand the mosaic of relationships affecting the development of civil society.  
H3 was also rejected, even though data confirmed the main assumptions of the theory 
presented in 2.4.3, that foreign donors and the Russian CSOs are more likely to succeed 
with their long-term goals in a region where the authorities are supportive of a strong and 
fairly independent civil society sector (Sundstrom 2006). I find reason to wonder if there 
are any negative consequences of supportive authorities. In 5.1.2 I put forward the 
observation that efforts to develop civil society’s horizontal ties seem to be developed by 
the regional government in Murmansk, that sets up CSO meetings. Can civil society 
networks be effective when they are built on authorities’ will to unite? If this is the only 
foundation, the network would have no internal trust and reciprocity, but rather rest on 
implemented structures. In this way it resembles the Civic Chamber’s top-down in stead 
of horizontally organised construction. This said, even if the networks are established and 
initiated from outside, they are still used for internal purposes and can thus strengthen the 
cooperation between CSOs. The ultimate question is if such networks have a lasting 
effect.  
An additional interesting aspect with CSO-government interaction is that it is more likely 
to get ideas realised through contacts in the administrations. This makes personal 
relationships essential, like they were in the Soviet times with ‘opportunistic 
individualism’ and blat, and in the 1990s ‘new Russian individualism’ (see 2.2). If H3 
were correct, Norwegian organisations looking for partners should go for the Russian 
organisations that already have established good contact with the government. As seen in 
5.1, there was not much emphasis on this criterion from the Norwegian organisations. 
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Why is this not emphasised? After all, cooperation with government is important for 
many Norwegian CSOs that try to influence politics.  
The explanation is likely complex. Firstly, a majority of the Norwegian interviewees 
understand civil society as something separate from government. Accordingly, a strong 
civil society has the ability to affect authorities, and not be affected by them. There is an 
emphasis on a fundamental independence, reflecting the Norwegian debate about the 
state-CSO relationships in the Norwegian Model. Secondly, there is an ambiguous 
attitude towards the intentions of Russian authorities; the political situation is seen as 
developing in a less democratic direction. However, for liberal democracy to work there 
is a need for interaction with government.  
Although, what kind of interaction is it when one party, i.e. the authorities, has the power 
to decide the outcome at all times? Perhaps the characteristic of cooperation on a high 
level is that interests of authorities and CSOs overlap, and thus there can be a dialogue 
and realisation of common goals that might fit in some agenda. Greater official support 
for social aid focussed CSOs than for ENGOs can be an indicator of such an assumption. 
In this scenario government actors’ “key cards” must also have overlapping patterns with 
the key cards of the Russian and Norwegian CSO actors if an influential civil society is to 
develop from Norwegian support to North-West Russian CSOs. The influences of 
Norwegian democracy promotion discussed in this analysis can easily seem scarce in this 
big picture. What the Norwegian efforts really amount to will be the topic of the next and 
final chapter. 
 
94 
 
6. Conclusions from a crossing  
This final chapter is dedicated to the core question of how Norwegian democracy 
promotion influences the advocates of democratic development, in the form of CSOs, in 
North-West Russia. Where has this question led me? It has been a journey starting with 
the theoretical introduction of civil society’s role in democratic development, heading on 
through Russian transition and democratic history to foreign actors’ involvement therein, 
eventually ending up with Norwegian High North strategies and Norwegian influence on 
civil society actors operating in North-West Russia. The conclusions and questions 
presented in the following are the ultimate results of this crossing.  
6.1 Norwegian influence  
What are the results of the Norwegian policy of promoting democracy through funding 
CSOs? First and foremost there are influences on cross-border partnerships and so-called 
people-to-people cooperation. The partnerships between Russian and Norwegian CSOs 
seem stable over time, although project grants are only given on annual basis. The 
partners elaborate various projects in cooperation, and Norwegian funding is largely 
responsible for the existence of many of these. Russian CSOs are developed and even 
established through Norwegian funding, based on mutual ideals of society’s development, 
but also on Norwegian preconditions and government strategy.  
Furthermore, effects of funding rub off on the relationship between regional/local 
authorities and the CSOs. Influence can be enhanced if Russian CSOs use Norwegian-
oriented agendas to demonstrate opportunities for social policy of which Russian 
authorities approve. Norwegian funding is, however, not always positively perceived by 
the governors and majors. It has also been seen as intrusion and CSOs that are 
collaborating closely with Norwegians can end up with accusations of being spies or 
simply condescendingly called “Norwegian representatives”. In so far as Norwegian 
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funding for CSOs is perceived as undesirable by the authorities, Norwegian influence can 
actually initiate Russian resistance against cross-border influence. If the Russian officials 
replace foreign support, the negative reactions against Norwegian intervention could in 
fact trigger the further development of civil society in North-West Russia. Foreign 
supported Russian CSOs create a demand for financial aid by the temporary structures of 
supply – a reverse of the logic that demand generates supply. In such a case, the structures 
of sponsorship may remain in North-West Russia even if the foreign supporters pull out.  
Norwegian commitment to Russian CSOs is limited in time as well as resources, and the 
partners on both sides of the border seem to be aware of this. The Norwegians often have 
in mind to support the Russian organisation until it has the strength and influence it needs 
to stand on its own and create a support base in its community. Mostly this remains a goal 
for the future, and influence from Norwegian partners in stead takes the form of creating a 
demand for such a support base, and for continued funding. In the cases where local 
support bases seem to be reached, the Norwegian CSOs pull back more and more of their 
original support. The triangle of cooperation between the youth ENGOs NU, PiM and 
Aetas is an outstanding example of this, a result of a successful “organisation building 
programme”. The Russian organisations adopted the democratic model from NU and are 
pleased with the structure. On a more preliminary note, Troms Red Cross is still trying to 
convince their Red Cross partner in Murmansk that a democratic structure is a good idea.  
Overall the results of Norwegian democracy promotion through funding of CSOs are not 
outstanding or even noticeable for most people in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, since the 
CSOs do not seem to have a great impact on the society in which they operate. Civil 
society is weak partly because of the low popular participation. Broader public 
participation is required, but the projects mainly seem to focus on the government-CSO 
relations or on social aid and interests within a very limited group of the population. 
Broadening participation through membership does, however, not seem to be a popular 
solution for Russian CSOs which also experience public resentment towards such 
approaches, and thus quit looking for members when they reach the state required 
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“number three” and may register as an NGO. Norwegian models do not always 
synchronise well with Russian society. Member bases do not have to lead to more 
participation in civil society. With times of forced “voluntary” participation in 
organisations during communist rule fresh in mind, member bases can also have the 
contrary effect and scare slightly sceptical people off.  
Is the cross-border collaboration in any way significant for the development of a civil 
society and ultimately for a deeper democratic development in North-West Russia? 
According to the initial theoretical model of Freres (1999) strengthening civil society by 
ways of capacity building, civil education and other mechanisms would lead to 
empowerment and improve participation and ultimately give a deeper democracy, which 
in turn would positively influence civil society. Since my main data are subjective, I can 
show only to the CSO actors’ views of themselves, their situations and surroundings. 
These views draw a contradictory picture: both Norwegian and Russian CSOs have 
confidence in themselves when it comes to their role as civil society’s advocates for 
democratic rights and participation, but the Russian actors simultaneously regularly 
express disbelief in their own empowerment and stress popular apathy. Some even reject 
the idea of having a real civil society, since there is so little popular participation. It is 
difficult to argue that the partnerships and the funded projects have resulted in a deeper 
participatory democracy when the actors themselves doubt the effect their approaches 
have both on authorities and – on the other end of their target group – on the wider 
population. 
The Russian CSOs nevertheless emphasise that they have learned from the Norwegians to 
become more self-confident and not shy away from confrontations with the authorities. 
Persistent CSOs have focused on issues previously taboo in Russia, such as mental 
disabilities, and have changed society’s views on their subjects. The new openness in 
Russian society that several of the interviewees have referred to is intertwined with the 
openness of Russian pioneer civil society groups that had experienced a different reality 
through foreign partners. As a part of this tendency, some of the CSOs are starting to take 
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advantage of media publicity, by following Norwegian ways of “taking action” and 
giving statements, which the local TV or radio station then transmits to a local audience. 
Above all ENGOs and women’s rights groups take this approach. The Russian CSO 
representatives have an optimism and indisputable go-ahead spirit despite the negative 
opinion they have on the state of civil society in general.  
This said, I do not wish to exaggerate the impact of cross-border collaborations on civil 
society development. Mostly it seems that the greatest impact, with the more long-term 
success, is on ENGOs and equality/women’s movements – subjects of importance in 
Norwegian society. Yet in Russian society these issues do not have tremendous popular 
support. And yet the issues have clearly made their way into Russian society through 
outside influence with the opening of the Russian borders. In my data all the ENGOs 
except Aetas were started by Norwegian initiative, so to speak, built from scratch by 
Norwegian ENGOs. Of course there was a sentiment of environmentalism in North-West 
Russia with which the people who founded these ENGOs were willing to join forces. 
Ecology in Russia has been and still is seen as a field for experts, and “common” people 
were deemed unable to engage with such specialist fields. This is slightly changing with 
the grassroots ENGOs. In a cross-border cooperation perspective, it is interesting that a 
large majority of the partnerships examined here were initiated by Norwegian CSOs or 
individuals. In this light it is inevitable to wonder from which seeds the Russian ENGO 
grassroots sprouted. 
6.1.1 Cross-border civil society 
In 2.4.2 I expressed a wish to find out if the tendency of weak CSO networking still 
seemed to apply, or if communication between CSOs in North-West Russia now are part 
of a more robust collaboration. My findings strongly indicate that networking is under-
prioritised and that horizontal ties between CSOs with different issue areas still are 
generally weak, except for CSOs that work within the same focus areas. Furthermore, 
CSOs that cooperate with the same foreign partner tend to find each other and develop a 
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closer cooperation. An example is the partnership between Aetas in Arkhangelsk and PiM 
in Murmansk that was generated by their common cooperation with NU. 
This tendency of generating networks exists on both sides of the border. Thus, 
networking effects of cross-border partnerships rub off on Norwegian actors, as they find 
new partners in Norway that share views and interests in collaboration with Russia. For 
example did NND find new partners in Norway through a common interest in working 
with disabled children in Arkhangelsk. Troms Red Cross also expanded its network 
regionally in Troms as a side effect of the project cooperation with Murmansk Red Cross, 
as did KUN in Nordland in its cross-border women network. The Barents Cooperation 
also facilitates contact and generates interaction between regional and local actors as well 
as between Russian and Norwegian actors. Civil society consequently develops in 
Norway due to project collaboration with Russia. In this sense civic networking based on 
international important issues, like human rights, extends beyond geographic borders and 
may create a larger cross-border civil society. 
6.2 Crossing ideas and values 
Foreign ideas seem to grow as time in collaboration goes by, even in organisations that 
emphasize awareness of socio-cultural differences. Ideas cross over in both directions, I 
have been told. But do they really? In light of H2 I discussed Norwegian-oriented 
agendas that can develop when Russian CSOs collaborate with Norwegian partners. Are 
there also Russian-oriented agendas developing in Norwegian CSOs? Russian attitudes do 
not seem to rub off on the Norwegians to the same degree. Norwegian actors mention that 
they learn from the Russians about effectiveness and cultural values, and main grant 
givers stress that the cultural interaction is a two-way stream (Nilsen 2007 [interview]). 
My impression is that the main stream flows from the Norwegians without a visible 
counter-torrent. This forces me to ask if crossing the civic frontiers entails more of a 
substitution than exchange for the Russian actors.  
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On which understanding of democracy and civil society do Norwegians base their 
funding of Russian civil society? The main pattern I have found is that Norwegian actors 
who depend on government funding apply criteria for their Russian partners in 
accordance with the High North policy and Project Cooperation guidelines. Russian 
federal government has recently (April 2007) formulated a response to the Norwegian 
High North strategy, but the content of this document is yet (May 2007) to be made 
publicly available. It would be highly interesting to compare the content of the Norwegian 
and Russian documents, especially regarding a Russian response to Norwegian 
democracy considerations.  
According to the analysis made here, Russian and Norwegian values and perceptions of 
what is important in a democratic society are equal in some areas, especially on the 
connection between civil society and democratic rights. Russian actors do, however, 
emphasise what they see as problems of society, i.e. a weak civil society: people’s 
passivity in society due to authoritarian mentality, lack of popular support for CSOs, etc. 
It is clear that a certain understanding of post-communist and Russian mentality and 
society is required to understand the underlying challenges in need of attention.  
Social differences due to customs, history and culture can have great impact on the 
success of Norwegian CSOs’ work in Russia. For instance, personal relationships mean a 
great deal in all levels of interaction in Russian society. This is a phenomenon that the 
Norwegians are also familiar with, but do not emphasise as a criterion of success to the 
same degree that the Russians do. Likewise the term “political” is often said with a bitter 
aftertaste by Russian CSOs, whereas Norwegians feel that “political” awareness is a 
positively charged description of their CSO’s commitment. Furthermore, the Norwegians 
associate a horizontally connected civil society with a strong civil society – but do the 
Russians? Not always. Developing civil society might well be the long term objective for 
all, but networking is rarely an explicit goal for the Russian CSOs.  
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Although the idea of liberal democracy is often perceived as universal by its promoters, 
the civil society that is exposed to this idea also has a local mentality that might not be 
receptive of all aspects of liberal democracy. Norwegian goals of civil society 
development in North-West Russia tend to be based on a Norwegian agenda that is 
mostly perceived by the Norwegians as a superior alternative to “outdated” Russian 
perceptions of e.g. gender equality, opportunities for mentally disabled, indigenous 
peoples’ rights etc. Norwegian ideas and norms are even frequently seen as universal. 
Russian CSOs that cooperate with Norwegians are as demonstrated affected by this, and 
adopt Norwegian-oriented agendas early on. In financially and influentially unbalanced 
relationships Norwegian partners should remember that it is important not to alienate 
CSO goals from the larger Russian society that they ultimately hope will embrace their 
promoted objectives. 
6.3 Recommendations  
The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate the regional democracy enhancing role 
that Norway takes on in its High North policy, and its traceable influences in North-West 
Russia. It is important for a successful development of the democracy aspect in this policy 
to learn more about the impact that so-called democracy promotion has both on Russian 
and Norwegian civil society. I have suggested that Russian-Norwegian CSO cooperation 
influences both Norwegian as well as Russian civil society, although the former to a 
smaller degree. It would be interesting for future research to challenge this assumption 
and investigate the actual influences of Russian values and policies on Norwegian civil 
society. For now, based on the evidence presented in this thesis, I have two suggestions: 
One for the CSOs’ path ahead towards a more influential civil society in North-West 
Russia and another for future policy development of Norwegian funding. 
Primarily, CSO actors in my study express a constant need for both foreign and Russian 
support for wide-ranging system changes in addition to the limited annual projects. 
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Norwegian grants and cooperation can never improve the internal developments towards 
more liberal democracy if both the Russian public and the authorities do not agree with 
such system changes. In this perspective, collaborating with the authorities as well as with 
CSOs becomes imperative for Norwegian CSO actors who aim to influence the direction 
of democracy development in Russia. Norwegian partners should strongly emphasise the 
importance of cooperating with regional and local authorities, especially through personal 
contacts, to enhance acceptance of and stability for North-West Russian CSOs and their 
work in society. 
Secondly, funding is seen as too short-term. The financial insecurity connected with the 
annual grant cycle does not enhance a feeling of stability in the third sector. Norwegian 
civil society support to North-West Russian CSOs should be based on more predictability 
and continuity, which would benefit the CSOs’ credibility in Russian society. It is 
obvious that the trend of project-based funding is not the preferred manner of organising 
civil society support neither for Norwegian nor Russian CSOs. Long-term development of 
civil society can never be achieved through one single project, but it can surely prove 
rewarding to organise a longer programme or partnership. Thus, it is not so much the 
short-term project goals that are up against long-term development, as assumed in H1, but 
rather the project timeframe itself. A longer term perspective should be taken in by the 
Norwegian funders, so that project support can really be directed towards a long-term 
development of civil society and its corresponding participant democracy.  
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Appendix A: The CSOs and the Barents Secretariat    
ENGOs 
Nature and Youth/Priroda i Molodezh (PiM), Murmansk city.45 
Arkhangelsk Regional Youth Environmental Organisation (Aetas), Arkhangelsk city. 
Kola Environmental Centre ”GAIA” Apatity; Apatity Environmental Centre (Gaia), 
Apatity/Murmansk. 
Friends of the Earth/Norges Naturvernforbund (NNF), Oslo.  
Nature and Youth/Natur og Ungdom (NU), Oslo.  
Bellona Murmansk, Murmansk city.  
Indigenous peoples groups 
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East 
(RAIPON), Moscow. 
Working group of Indigenous Peoples (WGIP/BIPO), Murmansk city.  
The Sami Mission, Lavozero/Murmansk. 
Press  
Barents Press Russia, Murmansk city.  
Norwegian Local Radio Association/Norges Lokalradioforbund (NLF), Oslo.  
Social justice/equality rights  
Arkhangelsk regional voluntary organisation for children’s rights and care for disabled 
children and youth Zabota (Zabota), Arkhangelsk city. 
Arkhangelsk Regional Public Charitable Organization “RASSVET” (Rassvet), 
Arkhangelsk city. 
Bridges of Mercy, Arkhangelsk city. 
Feminist University of the North/Kvinneuniversitetet Nord (KUN), Steigen.  
 
45 The cities indicate the situation of the main or regional offices, often also the location for the interview. 
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Troms Red Cross, Bardufoss.  
North Norway’s Diaconal Foundation/Nord-Norges Diakonistiftelse (NND), Harstad.  
Norwegian Peoples Aid/Norsk Folkehjelp (NPA), Murmansk city  
The Norwegian Association for Persons with Developmental Disabilities Nordland/Norsk 
Forbund for Utviklingshemmede Nordland (NFU), Bodø.  
Regional Charity Foundation New Beginning (New Beginning), Murmansk city.  
Women’s Congress of the Kola Peninsula (CWKP), Murmansk city.  
Culture 
The People’s Academy Hålogaland/Folkeakademiet Hålogaland, Alta. 
Human rights and peace 
Den Norske Kalottkomité, Tromsø. 
Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Oslo.  
NGO support centres and grant generators  
Arkhangelsk Centre for Social Technologies Garant (Garant), Arkhangelsk city. 
Barents Youth Cooperation Office (BYCO), Murmansk city. 
New Eurasia Foundation (FNE), Moscow.  
Networking organisations 
Soroptimist Kirkenes, Kirkenes.  
Kirkenes Rotary Klubb, Kirkenes.  
The Norwegian Barents Secretariat in Kirkenes is organised as an inter-municipal 
company, owned by the three northernmost Norwegian counties of Nordland, Troms and 
Finnmark. The company’s Board has three members, one from each of the three counties. 
In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development each have an observer in the Board. The regional offices of the 
Barents Secretariat included in this study are located in Murmansk city and in 
Arkhangelsk city, and operated by local staff.  
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Appendix B: Questionnaire for Russian CSOs 
For introduction letter and Russian translation, see enclosed appendix F. 
Practical information 
1. Name of your organisation: 
2. Name(s) of current and/or prior Norwegian cooperating organisation(s): 
3. Theme of the project(s) you collaborate/ have collaborated on: 
4. How old is your organisation? 
5. How many people work in your organisation? 
6. How many members does your organisation have? 
The NGO's activities 
7. What are the main types of projects that your organisation organises? 
a. Do you organise seminars? (If the answer to this question is `no', please disregard b. 
and c.) 
Yes  No 
b. What are the typical themes of these seminars? 
c. Are any of the seminars just internal within the organisation? 
Yes No
8. Does your organisation arrange courses/ activities for the local population? (If the answer 
tothis question is `no', please disregard a.) 
Yes No 
a. What subjects are treated in these courses? 
9. Does your organisation attend seminars/activities with other NGOs in the region? 
Yes No 
10. Can you mention some other NGOs operating in the region? (If the answer to this question 
is`no', please disregard a.) 
Name of other NGOs: 
a. Do you maintain contact with these other NGOs? 
Yes No 
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11. How much time would you say that the organisation spends on administrative work monthly 
(paper work like registrations, reports, databases, and personnel administration)? 
a. Who does this kind of work? (Everybody at parts or a specialised post?) 
12. Are there only activists or also other employees (such as a secretary or cleaning personnel) 
working in your organisation?
Funding 
13. How is your organisation financed? (By the Russian government, firms, private donors, other 
foreign/international donors etc.) 
14. How much time is approximately used on fund rising in a year? 
15. What kind of projects does your organisation seek funding for? 
16. What kind of funding have you received (grants, money funding for projects, other) duringthe 
last six years? 
17. How long has your organisation been receiving foreign funding? 
a. How long has it been receiving Norwegian funding? 
18. How many applications for project funding have you done the past year? 
a. How many of these were directed at Norwegian sponsors? 
19. Do you cooperate with one foreign organisation or several? 
20. Do you produce written reports to your Norwegian cooperating organisation or funder? 
Yes No 
a. How many working hours a month does your organisation spend on reporting back to 
your Norwegian partner on the projects in your collaboration? 
b. How is this report work divided between the activists? (several different people who 
take turn writing them or the same people every time?) 
21. Have you acquired technical equipment as a result of project funding? 
Yes No 
a. Is technical equipment something you have applied for specifically? 
Yes No 
The political sphere 
22. What do you consider to be the most important political issues that concern your 
organisation? 
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23. Does the local/regional/federal government include your organisation in hearings on issues 
that concern you/ in which you have expertise? 
Yes No 
24. Does your organisation perform any kind of lobbying? 
Yes No 
25. Does your organisation invite politicians or representatives of governmental authorities on 
meetings etc.? 
Yes No 
26. Does your organisation spread information to the public about political issues? 
Yes No 
27. Is participating in/influencing local decision-making an aim for your organisation? 
Yes No 
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Appendix C: Questionnaire to Norwegian CSOs 
For introduction letter and Norwegian translation, see enclosed appendix F. 
Practical information 
1. Name of your organisation:  
2. Number of members in your organisation:  
3. Name(s) of Russian cooperating organisation(s):  
4. Theme(s) of the project(s) you collaborate on:  
Expectations  
5. What does your organisation look for in a Russian partner organisation?  
6. Does your organisation emphasise:  
a. Rapid results from the partner?  
Yes  No 
b. Reports/ evaluations from your partner?  
Yes  No  
c. Attendance on seminars?  
Yes  No 
d. Is there anything else you emphasise in the collaboration? (please fill in)  
7. Are there any criteria for collaboration that should be fulfilled in advance by a possible 
project partners?  
Yes  No 
a. If yes, could you mention some criteria? 
Details on the collaboration 
8. How did you get in contact with your Russian partner? (If you have several, please make a 
selection). 
9. When did you start - and possibly end - your collaboration?  
10. Would you repeat this collaboration? 
Yes  No 
a. Why/Why not?  
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Appendix D: Interview guide for Russian CSOs  
For Russian translation, see enclosed appendix F. 
Introduction: Tell me about what you do and the projects in progress.  
On foreign collaboration   
1. How was the contact with the Norwegian organisation established? (Who took the 
initiative?) 
2. What is important to you when you elaborate a project proposal to a foreign organisation?  
3. Do you consider possible priorities of your counterpart when you make such a proposal?  
4. How would you describe your relationship with your Norwegian collaborating 
organisation?  
5. Can you mention some challenges that you have encountered in this collaboration?  
a. What would in your view be possible ways of dealing with such challenges?  
6. How do you feel that the process of soliciting funding affects you? (Is it straining, time 
consuming etc?) 
7. What do you think of foreign funding of Russian NGOs in general?  
a. Of Norwegian funding in particular?  
On understanding of democracy 
8. What do you understand as “civil society”? 
a. Does your organisation emphasise development of civil society?  
b. Why?  
9. If local operation: What norms exist for civil activity in your local society?  
11. How would you define “democratic rights”?  
12. In what ways do such rights concern your organisation?  
13. What effects do you think that the project in question (reference to the project) might 
have on the development of an active civil sphere in your region? 
14. In your opinion, how are democratic attitudes developing in the region?  
a. In Russia in general?  
15. Do you feel that your organisation plays a part in creating democratic awareness?  
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16. How do you consider your influence on local political decision-making, for instance 
on…?  
17. How do you and the local/regional/federal government communicate? (Through protest/ 
instructions/ institutionalised forms of dialogue? Other forms?)   
18. How would you describe your organisation’s relationship with the other NGOs in the 
area?  
If the answer to question 10 in the questionnaire is ‘yes’, ask 19. and 20.:  
19. Do you collaborate with any of these NGOs?  
a. What do you collaborate on?  
b. How would you characterise the collaboration on the latest project you did with this 
organisation?  
c. Would you collaborate with them again?   
d. Why/ why not?  
20. Can you mention other NGOs in the region that are also collaborating with foreign 
organisations?  
a. Do you know if they also seek funding for civil society projects?  
b. Do you feel that you compete with these organisations for the same foreign 
funding?  
On the NGO’s conditions 
21. How would you characterise the importance of administrative work in your organisation? 
22. How would you characterise the level of salaries in your organisation? (Are you 
content/discontent with the level?)  
23. To what extent is foreign funding used to pay the activists’ salary? 
23. Finally - if you feel that there are more topics of relevance that we haven’t touched upon 
in this interview, please feel free to comment on this now.  
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Appendix E: Interview guide for Norwegian CSOs  
For Norwegian translation, see enclosed appendix F.  
1. Does your organisation focus on particular types of organisations in Russia? What kinds?  
a. Do you focus on particular areas or regions in Russia? Which ones?  
2. How would you describe your relationship with your Russian partner?  
a. How would you say that the cooperation has developed over time?  
b. What does your organisation expect from the collaboration?  
3. Can you mention some challenges that you have encountered in this collaboration?  
a. What would in your view be possible ways to deal with such challenges?  
4. What do you understand as “civil society”?  
a. What does your organisation emphasise in the development of civil society?  
b. Why?  
c. Would you emphasise anything in particular in Russian civil society?  
5. What norms exist for civil activity in your local society?  
6. How would you define “democratic rights”?  
7. In what way do such rights concern to your organisation?  
8. What effects do you think that this collaboration project can have on the development of an 
active civil sphere in the region?  
9. Do you feel that your organisation plays a part in creating democratic awareness?  
10. In your opinion, how are democratic attitudes developing in the Russian part of the 
Barents region?  
11. How are democratic attitudes developing in Russia in general?  
12. Have you dealt with other institutions in Russian society?  
a. Which ones?  
b. Experiences from such contact?  
13. How have changes in the Russian society affected the project collaboration?  
14. Finally - if you feel there are more topics of relevance that we haven’t touched upon in 
this interview, please feel free to comment on this now.   
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